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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
ETHNIC XENOPHOBIA AS SYMBOLIC POLITICS: A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY OF 
ANTI-MIGRANT ACTIVISM FROM BRUSSELS TO BEIRUT 
Xenophobia is examined almost exclusively as a prejudice of advanced western nations.  I argue that 
the field of study of xenophobia must be re-conceptualized in order for comparative, cross-regional 
inquiry to take place.  With a new concept of ethnic xenophobia, this dissertation examines the 
determinants and causal mechanisms of ethnic xenophobic activity across developed and developing 
countries.  I integrate studies of xenophobia and theories of ethnic threat to explain that political elites 
rely on structural dimensions of threat to convert native anxieties into ethnic xenophobia through the 
use of anti-migrant myths and symbols.  I extend Stuart Kaufman’s theory of symbolic politics to 
further explain how elites mobilize ethnic xenophobic activity in order to gain or maintain political 
advantage among the native selectorate in their respective competitions for power.   
I use a Heckman Selection Model and a Structural Equation Model to test this theory across 14,000 
cases of ethnic xenophobic activity targeting refugees for seventy-two developed and developing 
countries from 1990 to 2014.  The results suggest that elites- across both developed and developing 
countries- do indeed exploit native anxieties in the aftermath of structural crises and events to provoke 
and mobilize hostilities toward migrants.  A most-different systems design is also used to illustrate the 
causal mechanisms of the argument across two pairs of cases, including Kenya and the Netherlands 
and Lebanon and the United States.  These cases provide additional support to the cross-regional 
explanation of ethnic xenophobic activity. 
This research opens the door to further exploration of similarities in the patterns and trends of ethnic 
xenophobia and anti-migrant intolerance across different country contexts.  The results suggest that 
efforts for the protection of migrants against such expressions of prejudice require improvement; and 
that relationships between native and migrant populations matter a great deal for the exploitation of 
fears and anxieties by political elites especially in and around elections.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Conceptual Nature of the Problem: 
The Ideological Bias in the Conceptual Construction of Xenophobic and Ethnic Conflict 
The harms, however, of xenophobia can be identified, contextually understood, and condemned, and highlighting them 
is what is needed to keep these harms from being swallowed up by nationalist narratives… -- David Haekwon Kim, 
2014 
1.1 One Man’s Xenophobia is Another Man’s Ethnic Conflict 
In October 2015 The Atlantic published an article titled, “Is Eastern Europe Any More 
Xenophobic than Western Europe?” in an attempt to illustrate the tit-for-tat accusations of 
xenophobia made by various heads of state against one another across the region (Horn 2015).  It 
all began with Chancellor Angela Merkel criticizing Eastern European governments for their 
isolationist response to the region’s refugee crisis in late 2015; from there, a firestorm of comments 
was exchanged between the Austrian Chancellor, the former U.S. Ambassador to Hungary and the 
Romanian President each accusing one of being more ‘xenophobic’ than the other.  Xenophobia is 
a term that has become increasingly mainstream in the context of European politics, especially as 
the rise of anti-immigrant populism collides with an unprecedented influx of asylum seekers from 
Syria and beyond.  There are, however, large discrepancies over its meaning and manifestations, 
especially in the cross-regional context.  The truth is, very little is known about expressions of 
xenophobia across the European continent, or elsewhere for that matter.  The majority of 
scholarship relies upon regional survey data to measure attitudes toward migration in a select group 
of countries in Western Europe and the United States.  Research on xenophobia outside of the 
Western European and American contexts is in its infancy, with a small selection of single-shot 
case studies or intra-regional examinations in Japan and South Africa.  There has, to date, been no 
systematic attempt at cross-regional research in the developing world, and no inklings of inquiry 
for comparative scholarship relating to xenophobia between developed and developing regions.   
The lack of systematic, comparative research on xenophobia is puzzling, especially given 
the breadth of recent cross-regional scholarship relating to other ‘discourses of exclusion’, such as 
racism and nationalism.  It is more puzzling still, as one considers the rising global trend of 
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xenophobic intolerance and the striking similarities of related activisms across developed and 
developing regions.  So, why does xenophobia appear to be a focal point of scholarship in the west 
to the exclusion of research elsewhere? 
The answer lies in the epistemic structure of mainstream social science research, in 
particular its perceptions of migration and the western nation state.  Constructivist scholars advise 
that we take a ‘second order’ perspective in scrutinizing what professional academics observe and 
do not observe in their respective fields of inquiry (Luhmann 1993).  Throughout the development 
of this project, including the documentation of tens-of-thousands of cases of xenophobic 
intolerance toward refugees in countries worldwide, it has become increasingly apparent that 
scholars have failed to observe a crude bias of their own design.  Namely, that the conceptual 
framework of xenophobia is constructed on a foundation of modernization ideology with the post-
war phenomenological timber of migration in the west.  In other words, anti-migrant intolerance is 
portrayed as a pathology of modernity— a pointedly civic ostracism whose exclusions rest on the 
presence of robust institutional frameworks and nationalized attachments to the collective imagery 
of the hierarchical western state.  This ideological overture has driven a conceptual wedge between 
perceptions of xenophobia in the west and the aggregation of ethnic intolerance elsewhere, to the 
detriment of cross-regional exploration and inquiry everywhere.     
In the eyes of Marx, Durkheim, Weber and Parsons, the growing differentiation, 
rationalization and modernization of society gradually reduced the importance of ethnic and 
national sentiments.  These markers of modernity were theorized to drive a more civic 
conceptualization of peoplehood reflecting the institutionalization and polity structure of the 
modern nation state.  Contemporary scholars of xenophobia cast western society as unique in the 
approximation of this modernist ideal— portraying anti-migrant intolerance as a decidedly civic 
prejudice that revolves around advanced institutional and ethical features of life in the western 
polity.   
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Civic life in advanced nations of the west is presumed to be highly evolved (Silvermann 
1991, Kohn 1994, Gellner 1995, Kim and Sundstrom 2014).  Individual identities are meaningfully 
attached to the institutions and governmental ethos of the state, including the functions they serve 
and the imagery they project.  Who they are and how they go about leading their daily lives 
corresponds directly to the security of their ontological presence in the nation-state.  Loyalties of 
ethnicity and kinship are not seen as complimentary to this civic ideal; instead, they contradict the 
most fundamental elements of western statecraft and design—the centrality of territorial 
boundaries, the authorities of law and order institutions, the sturdiness of majoritarian solidarity 
and the securities of citizenship in a sovereign nation (Ignatieff 1993, Stroup 2015). The 
personhood of others, or foreigners in this instance, is thought to be judged symmetrically—in 
apportionment with their ethical relation to the state, its institutions and its imagery.  The extent of 
foreign exclusion is fundamentally drawn from the specific historical and contextual orientations 
of migration in the west, and the corresponding salience of civic attachments and nationalized 
identities among native members of society.  The postwar experiences of western nations, including 
intense industrialization, colonization, and consolidation of national identities, are treated as 
essential to understandings of modern xenophobic expression; particularly as these processes relate 
to the large-scale arrival of migrants from former colonies, the pursuance of nation building 
programs, and the development of robust immigration control regimes.  For example, in a 1991 op-
ed in the French magazine Le Monde, psychoanalyst and feminist writer Julia Kristeva said that, 
“[T]here is a French national idea which could constitute the optimal version of the nation in the 
contemporary world” (Le Monde, 29 March 1991).  This ‘optimal version’ of French national 
identity, specifically the secularization of the state and its institutions, is popularly characterized as 
antithetical to that of non-European (especially North Africa) migrants and the countries from 
which they arrive (Silvermann 1991, Taguieff 2001).  According to western scholars, the exclusion 
of migrants from the contemporary world-view of mainstream French identity is mediated by the 
state’s attempts to recreate the social and civic boundaries that collapsed with decolonization 
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through the assimilationist models of citizenship developed in the postwar period (Balibar 1988, 
Silvermann 1991, Rose 1994).  These processes are believed to legitimize the forcible ostracism 
and widespread criminalization of migrants within the state and civil society; and rationalize the 
pervasive fears and suspicions of native nationals against the etranger or immigre.    
The portrayals of western exceptionalism and the processes of civicization that are thought 
to have contributed so greatly to its unique brand of foreign intolerance remain virtually 
unchallenged in the existing scholarship.  Instead, these conceptualizations of xenophobia are 
reinforced in a growing number of studies that widen the existing analytical gulf between developed 
and developing states.  The framework is discriminatory in the sense that it assumes vast conceptual 
and operational incongruities in the nature of xenophobic expression across regions. Developing 
states are seen as incapable of experiencing xenophobia in the same ways as western nations; 
mainly because they lack the civic and experiential necessitates that are associated with foreign 
salience in modern societies.  But also because they are painted with the same ‘ethnic’ brush as the 
foreign migrants arriving on western shores (see Table 1.1).  The insinuations throughout the 
literature are numerous, for example: traditions of pan-Africanism reflect territorially unbounded 
societies that prioritize kinship and tribal relations over national or Westphalian affiliations (Bach 
and Gazibo 2014; Sohjell 2013; Bratton 1994); the ‘artificial’ or ‘forcible’ carving-up of tribal areas 
into states in the paternalistic image of external actors and colonizers left institutions shallowly 
planted with patrimonial authorities in de facto positions of power (Alesina 2006; Green 2010); 
patterns of migration from developing states are directed primarily toward the west, and movement 
of people across borders within the region is largely inconsequential for receiving societies (Mantu 
2016; Landau 2007).  These myths- whether explicit or implicit- diminish the xenophobic reality 
that millions of foreigners face throughout states in the developing world.  They also distort the 
fact that the number of migrants, in particular refugees, is significantly higher within developing 
regions, and the expressions of xenophobia are nearly identical to those in the west without the 
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same level of recognition or specialized academic consideration.  In fact, the entire categorical 
scheme of xenophobic incidents in developing regions is biased toward a whole-sale aggregation 
of anti-migrant events into accounts of ‘ethnic conflict’, further illustrating the conceptual 
disparities and ideological undercurrents in the field (see Table 1.1 below).    
Table 1.1 
This table illustrates the differential categorization of similar incidents of xenophobia across developed and 
developing regions, in order to show side-by-side comparisons of the bias that characterizes understandings 
of ‘xenophobia’ in the west and ‘ethnic conflict’ elsewhere. 
Xenophobia in Developed Regions “Ethnic Conflict” in Developing Regions 
In the run-up to the 2016 Austrian Presidential elections a group of 
twenty Freedom Party nationalists surrounded and violently attacked 
three Syrian refugee men with knives and police-style batons in the 
streets of Vienna.  The attack took place mid-day in a popular, 
commercial area of the city with several witnesses including two police 
officers.  The President of the World Bank, Jim Yong Kim, quickly 
spoke-out against these ‘blatant acts of xenophobic hatred’ and warned 
against the escalation of such xenophobic activity throughout the region 
(NPR 2016; AP 2016).   
In late November 2015 a mob of masked assailants viciously attacked several 
Sudanese refugee patrons in a café on the outskirts of Cairo.  The café is 
located in a predominately refugee community known as Masakin Osman 
which has been plagued in recent months by escalating violence toward 
refugees in cafes and shops in the area (World News Digest 2015).  The 
business owners and other victims claim that police have never interviewed 
them to investigate the attacks or made any statements to the community 
regarding any of the incidents.  The Associated Press labeled the incident as 
an ‘ethnic gang’ attack (AP 2016). 
The fire-bombing of refugee registration centers throughout Germany 
in late 2015 was quickly addressed as a ‘horrific xenophobic event’ in 
a string of incidents that targeted the growing number of Syrian 
refugees in the country (UNHCR 2015; Connelly 2015).  Many experts 
pointed toward the mainstreaming of the radical right along with the 
growth in native fear and uncertainty as explanations for the uptick in 
hostilities (Betts 2015; PRI 2015).  Others suggested that the fire-bombs 
were intended as retaliation for preceding events in Paris or as a 
deterrent for other prospective terrorists in the region (Guardian 2015; 
Herbert 2015; Times 2015).   
Similar arsonist attacks against Syrian refugee communities in Lebanon a few 
months prior, in 2014, received little attention from the international 
community and were not directly referenced as xenophobic in nature.  After 
the burnings in Lebanon, Nadim Houry - Deputy Director of Human Rights 
Watch for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) - stated, “Even prior to 
the large number of arrivals in Lebanon, we have definitely seen an increase 
in hostilities toward refugees— with arsons, police violence, and local 
opposition.  There is plenty of fear-spreading and blaming, especially in 
Beirut, but not a lot of attention or concern about the consequences (HRW 
2015; Houry 2015).”   
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001 white supremacist and anti-
immigrant groups staged protests in major cities throughout the United 
States calling for the immediate detention and- in some cases- corporal 
punishment of resident refugees, especially those from the Middle East. 
They also demanded an end to the US resettlement program.  Groups of 
vandals in Minneapolis and St. Paul Minnesota busted windows and 
tagged local refugee shops for nearly two weeks before being 
apprehended by the police.  The President of the neighboring University 
of Minnesota spoke-out against the vandalisms as ‘disheartening 
xenophobic retaliations’ to the Trade Center attacks three weeks prior 
(U. Minnesota 2001).   
Somali refugees in Kenya were targeted by government crackdowns in 2001, 
which included several violent episodes of mass arrest in and around Nairobi. 
Refugees throughout the country reported violent and non-violent incidents 
including kidnappings, intimidation, robbery, vandalism of property and 
sexual assault from locals and security forces.  An Amnesty International 
report documented many of the cases, referencing the activity as mostly 
‘ethnic and tribal conflict’ (AI 2001; Al Jazeera 2001).   
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On February 23, 1995 a seventeen year old refugee male from the 
Congo was shot and killed by a group of three men posting election 
posters for the rightist leader Jean-Marie Le Pen in the port city of 
Marseille.  The Le Pen supporters called it a ‘justified killing’ of an 
illegal stranger threatening the safety of their city.  French Prime 
Minister, Edouard Balladur, stated publicly that ‘such xenophobic 
outrages would not be tolerated’ (Reuters 1995).   
In late 1995, local Ivorians worked in coordination with para-military forces 
to attack a Liberian refugee community near the capital.  Nearly two-hundred 
refugees were killed and over five-hundred were wounded.  Attackers stated 
that the shelling was in retaliation for cross-border violence from Liberian 
rebels three months prior.  The Liberian refugee community was relocated by 
the UNHCR in fear of further violence.  The New York Times labeled the 
event as a ‘mass-casualty ethnic clash’ (NYTimes 1995).   
In February of 1994, six firebomb attacks across Holland, Sweden and 
Norway killed ten refugees and injured four others.  In a separate 
incident, a proposed asylum center at Limburgian Meerssen in Holland 
was firebombed twice in one month. In Denmark, an asylum center was 
burned down days before seventy six refugees were due to move in. 
And in Belgium a factory being converted into a refugee center was 
destroyed by protesters.  Journalists blamed the rise in ‘xenophobic 
tensions’ on tough new regional asylum laws, including the Labour 
party’s Government Asylum Bill in the UK (Goodchild 1994; The 
Independent 1999).   
Refugees in the northern camps of Uganda went on hunger strike in June 
1993 after a series of threats from locals and police harassment.  The regional 
UNHCR representative stated that ‘native and ethnic frustrations’ had 
reached a breaking point and camp authorities feared for the safety of the 
refugees, especially those self-settled on the periphery of the camps without 
protection (Stackhouse 1993; The Globe 1993).   
A Sri Lankan refugee man died in an Italian hospital corridor for lack 
of treatment of a broken leg he received from a xenophobic attack in 
the streets of Rome.  Two weeks later a wave of gun attacks against 
refugees in Stockholm killed two men from Zaire and injured twelve. 
Members of a neo-Nazi organization known as White Aryan Resistance 
were prime suspects.  A spokesperson from a local immigrant advocacy 
organization called for a 24-hour general strike to protest the 
‘xenophobic outrage’ (The Ottawa Citizen 1992).   
In 1991, the Malawian government spoke out against Mozambican refugees 
as unduly burdening the country during the worst drought on record.  Days 
after, Mozambican refugees were rounded-up and relocated to the Lisungwe 
Camp.  The camp was targeted by angry local gangs who set fire to garbage 
piles and relief rations on site leaving resident refugees without adequate food 
supplies.  The local area camp commissioner suggested that security presence 
around the camp be increased to avoid future ‘hostile ethnic encounters’.  
Local residents condemned the camp and the continuation of assistance to 
refugees as unjust during a period of such national struggle and uncertainty 
(French 1991; Guardian 1991).   
Twentieth century scholars of nationalism have ventured down this misleading path of 
civic exceptionalism before, developing distinct methodological and theoretical agendas along the 
ethnic/post-ethnic binary (Ignatieff 1993, Kohn 1994, Hjerm 1998).  Their efforts are being undone, 
however, by scholars who persistently chip away at the myths of this dichotomization with the 
pluralities of the nation-state reality.  The notion that societies of nations, and their interactions 
with one another, are distinguishable along civic and ethnic lines is misguided, at best.  It also runs 
the risk of unwittingly reinforcing the presumptions of nationalistic prejudice it looks to avoid 
(Wimmer 2002, Act" 2006, Stroup 2015). The same can be said of xenophobia.  As much as 
Nigerians used the apparatus of the state and its influence over civil society to systematically expel 
hundreds of thousands of resident Ghanaian migrants from the country throughout the 1980s; the 
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United States used its powers of exclusion for a massive deportation and internment campaign, 
involving nearly two hundred thousand Japanese Americans in incarceration camps throughout 
World War II.  For scholars of xenophobia, the similarities across regions and contexts are eclipsed 
by the differences to a point that has paralyzed the field of inquiry, personifying Gidden’s ‘container 
model of society’ (Giddens 1992).  It is verging on unthinkable that xenophobic intolerance could 
be, and likely is, similarly spawned from Brussels to Beirut, or that ethnic dimensions of foreign 
hatred could reside alongside modern civic exclusions.  The ideological barriers of modernism and 
civic difference in the ‘contemporary nation-state’ do not have to trap the conceptualization of 
xenophobia in a cage of western regionalism.   
This project argues that xenophobic intolerance is neither post-ethnic nor contextual.  It 
denies that xenophobia is a bump on the linear pathway of advanced nations to the ‘ideal humaine’, 
or that it is a specific experiential manifestation of western state-craft and historical exclusion.  It 
refutes that xenophobia is a pure prejudice, in the sense that it is formed by a singular thread of 
civic or racial or nationalistic intolerance.  And it absolutely rejects that the societies of developing 
nations are so ethnically oriented that nationalized perceptions of foreignness are insignificant or 
under-formed.  Instead, it develops an integrated theory of xenophobic activity and draws attention 
to the similarities of xenophobic expression across developed and developing regions through the 
systematic examination of over fourteen thousand cases of xenophobia across a varietal mixture of 
seventy-two countries from 1990 to 2014.  
1.2 The re-Ethnicization of Xenophobia 
In order to address the conceptual pitfalls of xenophobia in the present literature, this 
project identifies xenophobia as both a form and function of ethnic conflict.  I reassert xenophobia’s 
conceptual location along the spectrum of theories of ethnic conflict and present systematic case 
evidence to underscore the fallacy of previous western designations.  Throughout this study, it is 
made evident that western countries are not exceptional in the ways they experience xenophobic 
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intolerance, nor are the causal mechanisms distinct from those in developing regions.  As discussed 
in detail above, the conceptual field of xenophobia is dislocated from the broader, related enterprise 
of ethnic conflict scholarship to the detriment of cross-regional examination.  The first step in 
remedying the deficiencies of the existing field is to construct an unbiased concept of xenophobia 
that can become part of an integrated theoretical framework.   
Following Max Weber (1985:237), ethnicity is understood as a subjectively felt belonging 
to a group that is distinguished by a shared culture and by a common ancestry.  This belief in shared 
culture and ancestry rests on cultural practices perceived as “typical” for the community, or on 
myths of a common historical origin, or on phenotypical similarities indicating common descent 
(Weber 1978:385-298; Schermerhorn 1970; Erikson 1993; Jenkins 1997; Cornel and Hartman 
1998).  In this broad understanding of ethnicity, “race” is treated as a subtype of ethnicity, as is 
nationhood.  Xenophobia may occur simultaneously with other prejudices in this framework of 
ethnicity, or be ensconced within them (which is often the case with nationalized narratives of 
racism, for example).  But it remains conceptually distinct from racism, nationalism, or nativism.1  
It is useful to reframe this conceptualization into a more pluralist understanding of what 
will be called ethnic xenophobia.  Ethnic xenophobia may be directed toward any migrant, 
including immigrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers or those individuals and people-groups 
perceived as such.  It may manifest along a variety of different planes of fear and hatreds toward 
foreigners, including cultural practices, phenotypical traits, linguistic traditions, political histories, 
or various combinations and degrees of these singularities.  It is not a ‘natural’ response by native 
populations to the presence of foreigners.  Like racism and nationalism, it is a social and political 
phenomenon that contributes to the marginalization and/or exclusion of migrant groups in social 
and national settings.   
1 For more on the existing controversies of categorization relating to various discourses of exclusion, 
specifically involving the anti-racist approach in the United States see Wimmer (2014).   
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Ethnic xenophobia occurs amid ordinary exclusions, hierarchies and indignities based upon 
ascriptions of a subject not properly belonging to the civic community or society.  This may take 
the form of thinking that some person or group cannot be authentic participants in a nation’s 
cultural, linguistic, or religious traditions, and even that they cannot be associated with the soil of 
the land or the blood of its people (Kim and Sundstrom 2014). In the latter, the institution has a 
collective intention or neglectful orientation that ostracizes or excludes a group from the 
mainstream.  In the spirit of Arenditian statelessness, ethnic xenophobia may be institutionalized 
within the policies of a state or in the practices of its civic actors (including the police and military 
forces) taking the form of nativism once it reaches the point of systematized preference for nationals 
or indigenousness.  In its observed form of activism, it may be agentive, or individualized, with 
atomistic expressions of xenophobia occurring at the interpersonal level without the direct, 
incidental involvement of broad structural exclusions or discriminations among other societal or 
institutional entities.   
Conceptual proximities include those of racism, nativism, nationalism, and ethnocentrism.  
Ethnic xenophobia, like these other subordinations, is not one thing.  The ideas of any of these 
intolerances are highly interactive across societies and throughout histories, especially with respect 
to the nationalization of various prejudices to a point where they endure unseen.  In the United 
States, especially, there is such a historical overlap between racist ideas and events and nativist and 
xenophobic ones that these ideas are codependent and at times blend into each other.  Nevertheless, 
there are important differences between types of prejudice and structural exclusion that need to be 
addressed for equally important historical, socio-scientific, and practical reasons.  For example, in 
contemporary philosophical debates about racism, with its three models of racism- behavioral, 
doxastic, and affective- the focus is on the behavior, beliefs and attitudes that highlight on perceived 
racial difference rather than foreignness (Garcia 1996).  While the perception of racial difference 
is often indistinguishable from perceived foreignness, the two are not necessarily related.  In short, 
 
 
10 
 
migrant outsiders are not necessarily racial outsiders.  We can imagine someone who qualifies as a 
racist because they have malevolent feelings about a group, but nevertheless may accept them as 
citizens (though not equal citizens). 
Nativism, likewise, merges with ethnic xenophobia throughout history to influence various 
manifestations of ostracisms relating to perceived foreignness.  But the particular pursuits of 
chauvinistic ethics and racial group-interests based on claims of indigenousness are wholly 
nativistic.  “Nativism is a useful concept and marks the point in which ethnic xenophobia is elevated 
to a national political project that is committed to the exclusion of groups perceived as foreign, and 
perhaps even to the egoistic promotion of the perceived interests of a purified nation (Higham 
2002).”  Ethnocentrism is similarly distinguished from ethnic xenophobia in the sense that its 
conceptual and operational center is ethnic or cultural superiority, not necessarily fear or suspicion 
of foreigners.  Psychologists suggests that the in-group favoritism associated with ethnocentrism is 
not a necessary concomitant for out-group hostility (Struch and Schwartz 1989, Hammond and 
Axelrod 2006, Ogretir and Ozcelik 2010).  Ethnic xenophobia is, instead, a priori characterized by 
a fervent focus of hostilities toward outsiders, which does not necessarily reflect in-group 
favoritism.   
The conceptual relationship between ethnic xenophobia and nationalism is considerably 
more complex, since nationalism often envelopes ethnic xenophobia in nearly inextricable ways, 
particularly in its twentieth century manifestations.  It also contains doctrines that legitimize ethnic 
xenophobia as part of the nationalistic narrative.  For example, the organization, Stop Islamization 
of Europe (SIOE) displayed the following phrase on its website in 2007, “…racism is the lowest 
form of human stupidity, but Islamophobia is the height of common sense.”  Nationalism is 
commonly defined as an extreme form of patriotic feeling, principles or efforts, especially marked 
by a feeling of superiority over other countries.  But the primary scholarly definition comes from 
Ernest Gellner, who conceptualizes nationalism as, “The doctrine that the political unit (the state) 
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and the cultural unit (the nation) should be congruent” (Gellner 1995, Snyder 2000) .  As prior 
discussion has shown, the geo-spatial boundaries of nationalism are confined to physical areas in 
ways that ethnic xenophobia is not.  Ideas of a foreignness that inspire ethnic xenophobia may or 
may not be attached to territorial boundaries or understandings of statehood.  Considerations of 
sovereignty and symbolic ideological or national-historical integrity are also constituent 
dimensions of nationalism in ways that are unnecessary for ethnic xenophobia.  Ethnic xenophobia 
is far more likely to be contextualized alongside or within nationalism when national persons 
perceive foreign threats or inundations.  It can also be spurred on in the context of nationalist 
aspirations as was the case in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union as establishments 
over territorially sovereign nation states sharped perceptions of foreignness between the peoples of 
would-be nations.   
Situating these prejudices alongside one another on the common spectrum of ethnic 
conflict provides more collective utility, and plurality, to the conceptualization of ethnic 
xenophobia and the ways it is likely to relate to and interact with other intolerances.  It also allows 
one to appreciate all of the ways in which ethnic xenophobia may be expressed, in observable forms 
of activism across context.  Unlike racism, studies of xenophobia have tended to emphasize its 
affective dimension with survey research projects that gauge attitudes and ideas relating to 
foreigners among native respondents.  This project, instead, emphasizes the behavioral aspects of 
ethnic xenophobia, specifically those that manifest into observable displays of activism against 
foreigners.  These forms of ethnic xenophobic activism include violent and non-violent action taken 
by native or perceived non-immigrant groups toward foreigners and perceived foreigners.  The 
activist may be an individual or a group, a representative of the state or a member of civil society, 
an entity of the military or state police force, or a private citizen.  Ethnic xenophobic activism may 
include (from non-violent to violent): taunting and gesturing, broadcasting and canvassing, imagery 
and graffiti, stalking and harassment, verbal and physical threats, protests and riots, intimidation, 
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vandalism and robbery, arsons and destruction of property, kidnapping, brutalization, physical and 
sexual assault, weaponized assault and armed battery, and individual and mass killings.   
1.3 The Road Map of the Manuscript 
Ethnic xenophobic activity is the phenomenon of interest examined throughout the course 
of this study, starting with a comprehensive review of the literature relating to ethnic conflict and 
xenophobia in Chapter 2 and leading into an integrated theoretical framework in Chapter 3.  The 
project focuses primarily on ethnic xenophobic activity as it pertains to refugee populations in 
countries throughout the developed and developing world.2  The corresponding theory of ethnic 
xenophobic activity explains that the meaning of structural dimensions of threat are mediated by 
the anti-migrant rhetoric of elites to mobilize ethnic xenophobic activity for political gain.  I draw 
on the work of Stuart J. Kaufman to argue that elites use the symbolic politics of migration to 
convert structural uncertainties into existential threats which, in turn, inspires extreme anti-migrant 
activity, including violence.  Chapter 4 includes the operationalization of the primary variables as 
well as a detailed description of an original dataset, including event count data of incidents of ethnic 
xenophobic activity from seventy-two countries across developed and developing regions from 
1990 to 2014.  Chapter 5 details the econometric methods and estimators used to examine the causal 
determinants and structures of ethnic xenophobic activity.  These econometric estimators include 
the Heckman Selection Model and Structural Equation Modeling.  It also provides theoretically-
based justifications for the use of both econometric models in the context of presenting the results.  
Chapter 6 offers two pairs of most-different case studies: Kenya and the Netherlands and Lebanon 
and the United States in order to more fully illustrate the causal mechanisms that lead to ethnic 
xenophobic activity and their cross-national similarities.  Chapter 7 includes the conclusion of the 
study with a discussion of its implications that relate to the relationships between migrants and their 
                                                          
2 The term refugee as it is used here corresponds to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
and those persons determined to be refugees by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) in accordance with its member states.   
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hosts from the various perspectives of practitioners who work in the field of refugee protection and 
advocacy.   
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Chapter 2: Bridging the Conceptual Divide between Theories of Ethnic Conflict and                         
Studies of Xenophobia 
 
2.1 Introduction to the Theoretical Integration 
In order to more fully establish a conceptual framework of ethnic xenophobic activity as it 
has been presented in Chapter 1, it is necessary to review two, seemingly disparate, fields of 
literature.  But more than a review of these literatures, it is important to bridge them together to 
further show how xenophobia (as it has traditionally been conceptualized) is part-and-parcel of 
ethnic conflict.  The two primary literatures of interest are (1) studies of xenophobia and (2) ethnic 
conflict scholarship.   
This chapter asks how a comprehensive theory of ethnic xenophobic activity may best be 
developed in conjunction with this existing scholarship.  The conceptual endeavor that follows 
presents a fresh look at existing studies of xenophobia and ethnic conflict in an integrated 
framework in order to reveal that xenophobia is not, in fact, excludable from the discourse of ethnic 
conflict.  And that theories of ethnic conflict can accommodate existing explanations of 
xenophobia, regardless of their geographic specification.   
The first portion of this chapter uses theories of ethnic threat and competition to bridge 
explanations of ethnic conflict and xenophobia together.  It also shows that these theories identify 
the many structural and discursive dimensions of threat that become central to the mobilization of 
fear and violence toward migrants and ethnic others.  The second section of the chapter begins the 
disaggregation of these threat dimensions within the literature.  It specifically discusses the 
economic threat hypothesis— emphasizing the role of perceived competition with migrants and 
ethnic minorities among certain sectors of the native labor force. The third section focuses on 
explanations of cultural, social and political threat. It explains how ethnic minorities and migrants 
become targets of majority hostilities through perceived power-threats and incompatibilities.  The 
fourth section, underscores the importance of ethnic identity formation and the role of elites in 
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actuating ethnic, or migrant, threats to native security or survival. I draw on the works of Olzak 
(1992), Kaufman (2001), and Brass (1997) to illustrate how ethnic boundaries become salient and 
available for exploitation by political elites.  In conclusion, I connect these studies to those of 
xenophobia, focusing squarely on research that explains the rise of the Radical Right in Europe.  
Fifth, and finally, the chapter offers thoughts on how to expand on the integration of these literatures 
in order to develop a cross-national theory of ethnic xenophobic activity, which will be the main 
objective of Chapter 3.   
2.2 The Key to Integrating Seemingly Unrelated Literatures: Theories of Ethnic Threat and 
Competition 
Theories of ethnic threat and competition are central to both literatures on xenophobia and 
ethnic conflict.  The baseline presumption is that particularly large and concentrated waves of 
newcomers, who are perceived as ethnically or racially distinct, are especially likely to receive a 
hostile response from native populations.  Furthermore, as migration and immigration of distinct 
ethnic and racial populations surge, the potential for protest and violence directed against ethnically 
distinct newcomers becomes more likely (Koopman and Olzak 2004).  Those perceived as ethnic 
others by native groups are commonly labeled as ‘trespassers’ who compete directly with locals for 
access to scarce resources or public goods and services (Hannan 1979).  They may also present 
clear confrontations to the majority culture or belief system, including national historical narratives 
of righteousness or frameworks of patriotic identities.  In addition, suspicions can arise in relation 
to the intention of arriving foreigners, especially if native groups have experienced past episodes 
of domination or attacks from similarly perceived ‘outside forces’.  Distinguishing the social, 
political and economic features of ethnic threat and competition is analytically useful, and will be 
done in the following sections of this chapter, but it is important to note that in practice these 
elements often occur simultaneously and are mutually reinforcing.  Taken together, this body of 
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literature on the so-called ‘ethnic threat’ forms the basis upon which xenophobia may be integrated 
into the paradigm of ethnic conflict scholarship. 
Ethnic conflict scholars have, predominately, viewed ethnic threat as a mechanism by which 
groups spiral into a reciprocal exchange of hostilities and attacks, inspiring what is often referred 
to as a ‘security dilemma’ between groups; meaning that each group defines itself in relation to the 
other as existentially incompatible.  The only certain end to such dilemmas is engaging in conflict 
to dissolve (or render into submission) the opposing group.  For studies of xenophobia, ethnic threat 
is more asymmetrically defined.  The activation of threat hostilities among native groups is aimed 
in a single direction (without effective reciprocation) toward ethnic outsiders, in this case migrants.  
Although migrant groups may share in the affective fears or suspicions of natives, which may 
prevent them from pursuing meaningful integration into local society, the reciprocation of hatreds 
is in reaction to (or retaliation against) xenophobic intolerance within the native community.   
Theories of Economic Threat 
Following an economic logic, the first – and most elemental version of ethnic threat theory- 
posits that as ethnically distinct groups, such as migrants, enter a population, competition for 
limited resources ought to increase (all else being equal).  Economic contraction further intensifies 
competition over increasingly scarce resources, raising the potential that dominant groups will 
restrain or exclude less powerful competitors (Olzak 1992).  This argument also implies that 
marketplace competition will raise perceptions that unfair competition is occurring, increasing the 
likelihood that tensions will lead to activism and violence (Bobo and Hutchings 1996).   
The types of economic competition that spark ethnic conflict and xenophobic activity, 
depends largely on the distribution of members of different ethnic (or migrant) groups into 
productive niches (Hannan 1979).  Economic competition is believed to rise to the extent that niche 
overlap occurs (Olzak 2013).  This happens when new groups invade another’s niche, which can 
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be fueled by in-migration, economic contraction, or upward mobility of a disadvantaged group.  
Conflict arises when members resist the entry of members of an ethnically distinct group into their 
niche.   
One of the most consistent findings throughout existing studies of xenophobia reflects the 
niche overlap hypothesis, particularly in low-income earning, or industrial, sectors of the native 
economy.   In their study of ethnocentric attitudes in the Netherlands, Eisinga and Scheepers (1989), 
explain that a large low-skilled workforce- combined with low levels of education- increases the 
level of threat perceptions toward migrants among majority Dutch communities.  In a similar study 
of anti-migrant attitudes in Croatia, Kunovich and Deitelbaum (2004) advance this idea, suggesting 
that new generations of migrant arrivals compete directly with low-skilled native workers for 
minimum wage earning positions (or below) which drive perceptions of unfair job loss or 
reductions in native earning-potential.  Coenders (2001) adds further that this competition is 
especially problematic when native workers perceive wage rate reductions as a result of a growing 
presence of migrants in the local workforce (Coenders 2001, Scheepers, Gijsberts et al. 2002).  “It 
is a matter of status frustration among the native workforce who grow dissatisfied with precarious 
livelihood circumstances.  This frustration is accelerated by fears of further deterioration as a 
consequence of immigration, leading individuals to develop hostilities toward those they perceive 
as a threat to their position (Felling and Peters 1991, Feldman and Stenner 1997), (Pedahzur and 
Canetti-Nisim 2004, Tolsma, Lubbers et al. 2008).”   
Theories of Cultural, Political and Social Threat 
Other sorts of status fears and frustrations- including those qualified as cultural or political- 
may invoke similar native motivations toward ethnic hostility and action.  In the political field, 
ethnic conflict scholars emphasize that mobilization arises when newcomers, or ethnic minorities, 
pose threats to the power balance and political control of dominant groups.  In this view, powerful 
ethnic groups mobilize collective action in response to a potential loss in political control (Olzak 
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1992; Tolnay and Beck 1995).  Such power-threats may be instigated by a recent arrival of a racially 
or ethnically distinct population (to a city, state or country) that threatens the political balance, or 
by a sudden shift in political opportunities afforded by new or expanded voting rights.  
Consequently, politically threatened groups will mobilize to restore the status quo.   
Prospect theorists, in particular, focus their explanatory energies on how the threat of a loss 
is especially motivating, even more so than the possibility of a gain (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), 
(Midlarsky 2011).3  Using this perspective, lynching and ethnic violence, anti-migrant protest, 
disenfranchisement, racial gaps in arrests and incarceration can all be understood as a response to 
real or perceived threats activated by a minority population’s increased political leverage 
(seemingly at the expense of the majority-favored balance of power).   
In a similar cultural-nationalist vein, Max Weber and Michele Lamont emphasize the 
notion of ‘group honor’.   They elaborate that group honor is, “The feeling of dignity that comes 
from seeing oneself at the apex of the moral history of mankind rather than in one of its shadowy 
valleys and the personal security and psychological stability granted by a sense of belonging to a 
community whose support one can rely and where one feels culturally ‘at home’ (Wimmer 2013).” 
They further explain that group honor, moral dignity, and personal identity combine with more 
mundane preoccupations, such as access to pastures, professions, public goods, or political power 
                                                          
3 And a second theory suggests that opportunity might actually have an inhibiting effect on activism Miller, 
J. and J. Krosnick (2014). The Origins of Policy Issue Salience: Personal and National Importance of Impact 
on Behavioral, Cognitive and Emotional Issue Engagement. Explorations in Political Psychology. Krosnick, 
Chiang and Stark. New York, NY, Psychology Press..  The ‘social loafing effect’ described by social impact 
theory argues that people devote less effort in pursuing a desired common goal when they believe others are 
working with them toward the same goal (a reiteration of Olson’s free-rider phenomenon) Olson, M. (1965). 
The Logic of Collective Action. Boston, MA, Harvard University Press, Latane, B. (1981). "The Psychology 
of Social Impact." American Psychologist 36(4): 13, Miller, J. and J. Krosnick (2014). The Origins of Policy 
Issue Salience: Personal and National Importance of Impact on Behavioral, Cognitive and Emotional Issue 
Engagement. Explorations in Political Psychology. Krosnick, Chiang and Stark. New York, NY, Psychology 
Press. theorize that a perceived negative policy change for someone who attaches a great deal of importance 
to an issue, would be extremely motivating; the same study found the policy change threat (representing an 
undesirable change on an issue) to be a more powerful motivator of activism or collective opposition than 
policy change opportunity.   
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to inform the struggle over who legitimately should occupy which seat in the arena of society.4  In 
this instance, it is the preservation (or restoration) of group honor- and its constituent parts- that 
invokes an atmosphere of competition between natives and ethnic others (or migrants).  For 
example, a report by Lord Ashcroft on the attitudes of the United Kingdom’s Independence Party 
(UKIP) shows that while immigration is the top concern among party supporters, they ‘are driven 
towards UKIP by a deeper unease simply with the way life has changed in modern Britain’:  
…schools, they say, can’t hold nativity plays or harvest festivals anymore; you can’t fly the flag of St George anymore; 
you can’t call Christmas Christmas anymore; you won’t be promoted in the police force unless you’re from a minority; 
you can’t wear an England shirt on the bus; you won’t get social housing unless you’re an immigrant… (Skey 2014). 
The sentiments of the UKIP appeal to broader factors of globalization and change, 
specifically the uneven exposure to the outcomes of globalization (such as increase trade flows and 
foreign direct investment) which increases perceived competition among ethnic groups and 
exaggerates the salience of ethnic boundaries.  But, even the small, localized changes at the 
neighborhood level have substantial impacts on perceptions of ethnic threat.  This is especially 
evident in residential and settlement patterns of ethnic minorities and migrants in historically 
majority-dominant communities.   
Ethnic residential segregation has long been viewed by social scientists as a major aspect 
of urban inequality and as a structural mechanism through which ethnic and racial minorities are 
excluded from opportunities, rewards, and amenities of the state and civil society (Massey and 
Denton 1988, Farley and Frey 1994, Clark 2002, Charles 2003)5.  For studies of xenophobia, it is 
also increasingly seen as a mediator of short-term inter-ethnic contact and isolation, thereby, 
holding implications for prejudice duration and the prevalence of xenophobic expression 
                                                          
4 This is not dissimilar to Anthony Giddens’ writings on ‘ontological security’ which refers to, “the 
confidence that most human beings have in the continuity of their self-identity and in the constancy of the 
surrounding social and material environments of action” (In The Consequences of Modernity, Giddens, A. 
(1992). The Consequences of Modernity. Stanford, Stanford University Press.).     
5 For further discussion on the reasons for ethnic residential segregation and whether it is self-selected or 
forced through discriminatory structural and societal patterns of discrimination see: Dill, V., U. Jirjahm and 
G. Tsertsvadze (2015). "Residential Segregation and Immigrants' Satisfaction with the Neighborhood in 
Germany." Social Science Quarterly 96(2): 15. 
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throughout native society.  Legge (2003) study of Germany, for example, concludes that the marked 
variations in contact with foreigners between the eastern and western parts of the country 
contributed to the uneven growth of xenophobia.  Residents of former West Germany, who were 
three times more likely to come into contact with migrants at work or in their neighborhood, 
displayed significantly more favorable attitudes (nearly 10 percentage points higher) toward 
migrants than their formerly-East German counterparts.  
The growing body of research on patterns of residential segregation and xenophobia also 
demonstrates that spatial segregation is associated with socio-economic status of the residents.  
That is, racial and ethnic minorities tend to reside in the poorer neighborhoods of the inner city 
while members of the majority population tend to live in affluent and prestigious neighborhoods 
(Semyonov, Gilkman et al. 2007).  Since individuals possess a ‘cognitive map’ of communities and 
neighborhoods and since individuals organize city-neighborhoods on hierarchical scale of 
desirability according to their social status and ethnic composition, ethnic or migrant 
neighborhoods have become less desirable, if not an undesirable, place of residence or entry.  These 
desirability structures of segregation are thought to influence inter-ethnic relations and perceptions 
as well—becoming a cause of prejudicial views against ethnic minorities and the communities in 
which they live.   
Conversely, the rapid desegregation of historically homogenous communities with ethnic 
newcomers is shown, also, to be characterized by social exclusion and intolerance, including acts 
of personal violence- such as forcible expulsion- against newly settled individuals and groups.  In 
their study of school desegregation in the United States, for example, Olzak, Shanahan and West 
(1994), find that more accelerated school desegregation significantly raised rates of protests against 
the busing of children from predominately African American communities.  Similarly, Mclaren 
(2003) uses Eurobarometer data to show that negative attitudes toward ethnic minorities and 
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migrants increased significantly during the implementation-period of an accelerated residential-
integration program in Brussels in late 2001.   
Theories of Security or Existential Threat 
There is a vast body of ethnic conflict scholarship that explains how threats of inter-ethnic 
insecurity mobilize violence.  In particular, rationalist and constructivist scholars explain that 
individuals work through a framework of social processes to strategically construct their ethnic 
identities; the outcome of these identity choices may produce more or less peaceful relations 
between groups.6  But third parties often interfere in these processes in order to influence identity 
choices in ways that provide maximum benefit to their position in the state and society.  The 
dominant narrative throughout these works is that large-scale ethnic violence and conflict is 
provoked by such third-party elites who seek to gain, maintain, or increase their hold on political 
power.7  The inter-ethnic provocations of elites are intended to spur perceptions of insecurity and 
incidents of actual violence so that group identities are constructed in more antagonistic and rigid 
ways.  Paul Brass (1997), for example, argues that Indian elites engaged in contests for power 
sometimes find it in their interest to publicly frame violent incidents as “communal”- whether they 
are or not- an interpretation that is then accepted by publics favoring more violence.  Brass explains, 
“When political elites interpret local disputes in an ethnic frame, they are merely giving people the 
license to pursue their own agendas under the banner of “communal conflict” (Brass 1997: 32; 
Fearon and Laitin 2000).”   
The same could be said of elites and their use of anti-migrant rhetoric.  Studies of 
xenophobia likewise designate the primary task of actuating security threats in the minds of native 
                                                          
6 The social processes of ethnic identity construction presented here are meant to theoretically dispute the 
premises of primordialism which claims that ethnic identities are ‘hard wired’, natural, or inevitable. 
7 Arguments of this sort have been around in political science and sociology for a long time, though without 
the constructivist language.  See: Simmel 1955; Cosner 1956.  See also diversionary war theory, for example, 
Levy (1989).   
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populations to political elites.  Increasingly, theories of Radical Right populism- for example- focus 
on the performance quality and personalities of anti-migrant leaders (the so-called charismatic 
leader thesis); of particular importance for these explanations is the elite’s ability to incite and 
coordinate the fears and grievances of native voters.  For most theorists, the shaping of anti-migrant 
hostilities among native voters, in particular, is pursued by right-wing elites through established 
party structures and systems which provide the resources (including the people, the stage and the 
material resources) to launch seemingly legitimate campaigns within a framework of fair and equal 
competition.  This again, like Brass mentions, grants supporters a license to pursue their own 
(including escalatory) agendas under the banner of “anti-migrant resistance”.   
In his book on the Lega Nord and the third-wave of right-wing populism, Andrej Zaslove 
(2011), explains how Umberto Bossi was able to capitalize upon the growing economic power of 
the Third Italy and the decline of the Christian Democratic hegemony to construct a formal alliance 
of several political ‘leagues’.  Bossi used these leagues to broadcast his populist accusations of 
corruption and incompetence within the central government—identifying migration as a central 
source of danger and threat (of all varieties) to Italian citizens.  In a 1991 press conference, Bossi 
said, “Immigration is out of control.  It is the responsibility of the central government to make sure 
we are not overrun by outsiders.  I will protect Italy and our way of life (Zaslove 2011: 14).” The 
leagues became mobilized around a heavily anti-migrant platform that featured emotional appeals 
to the existence, security and prosperity of native Italians.  League members were accused of 
inciting violence against migrants in their rallies and protests across the country, culminating in 
several widespread xenophobic events.  To use the language of Brass once-again, Bossi developed 
an “institutionalized system” of xenophobic activity, converting native anxieties into anti-migrant 
hostilities and tending the flames so that the Lega Nord might enter the mainstage of Italian politics.   
The case of Bossi and the Lega Nord is a good place to transition into the development of 
a more comprehensive theory of ethnic xenophobic activity, since it highlights the potential for 
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synchronizing the dimensional threat variants of the ethnic conflict scholarship together into a more 
complete causal sequence.  Chapter 3 will take on the task of expanding on the integration of the 
literature presented here, and draw, still further, theoretical conclusions to form a complete theory 
and a series of testable hypotheses.     
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Chapter 3: An Integrated Explanation of Ethnic Xenophobic Activity 
3.1 Introduction to an Integrative Theory of Ethnic Xenophobic Activity 
Taken together, the existing literature on xenophobia and ethnic conflict provides 
important insights into how a fuller conceptualization of ethnic xenophobic activity may begin to 
take shape.  Perhaps unwittingly, however, the existing scholarship reflects a broader framework 
of competing theories that can be used to develop an explanation of ethnic xenophobic activity.  
Two competing categories of explanations appear throughout the literature as the most important 
potential cross-national determinants of ethnic xenophobic activity: (1) constructivist explanations 
that draw on discursive, or symbolic, politics and the rhetoric of elites and (2) structuralist 
explanations which emphasize the actual social, economic, spatial or political conditions of the 
nation (or community).  Both would claim to have important implications for acts of intolerance, 
such as ethnic xenophobic activity.  For constructivists, ‘elite entrepreneurs’ are able to interfere in 
the social processes of native identity formation in ways that cast foreigners as threats or villains 
and mobilize acts of intolerance against migrants.  For structuralist scholars, ethnic xenophobic 
activity is most likely a function of structural dimensions of threat at the national level, including 
economic loss or political crisis.  Factors such as rapid urbanization, poor economic performance 
(especially in the employment sector), demographic changes, or transitions of government (during 
elections), sharpen the perceived negative images of migration among local host state populations 
in ways that increase the likelihood of ethnic xenophobic activity.   
I propose that both constructivist and structuralist explanations identify key factors that 
determine the incidents and the intensity of ethnic xenophobic activity.  The discussion of these 
theories generates a set of testable hypotheses regarding the determinants of ethnic xenophobic 
activity across developed and developing countries.   
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I also argue that the factors identified by these theories, while necessary, are not sufficient 
to develop a comprehensive causal account of ethnic xenophobic activity.  In this chapter, my main 
argument integrates constructivist and structural dimensions of threat to provide a more complete 
explanation of the ways in which structural dimension of threat- such as economic, political or 
social crises- among citizens of a nation are mediated by the anti-migrant discourse of elites that 
inspire hostility and activism against foreigners.  As mediators of the structural dimensions of 
threat, elites engage in strategic discourse, including the scapegoating of migrants, in order to 
mobilize ethnic xenophobic activity to gain or maintain political power. 
In developing this argument, this chapter asks two related questions:  What determines the 
incidents and the intensity of ethnic xenophobia in a country?  And, what are the causal mechanisms 
that lead to violent and non-violent ethnic xenophobic activity?  To answer these questions, this 
chapter is organized as follows.  The first section of this chapter discusses the constructivist and 
structuralist determinants of ethnic xenophobia.  This discussion produces several testable 
hypotheses that are used to test the accuracy of these theoretical predictions regarding the incidents 
and intensity of ethnic xenophobic activity.  The second section provides a discussion that 
integrates constructivist and structuralist theories to demonstrate the theoretical causal pathways of 
how the structural dimensions of threat are mediated through elite symbolic rhetoric to produce 
ethnic xenophobic activities that are both violent and non-violent.  
3.2 Competing Theories of Ethnic Xenophobic Activity 
Elite Constructions of Ethnic Xenophobic Activity 
In their explanations of ethnic conflict and intolerance, constructivist scholars emphasize 
the power of elite discourse and interference in the construction of extremist ethnic identities and 
conflict. Of particular importance are the symbolic elite narratives against ‘ethnic others’ and 
outsiders which are intended to induce threats and inspire violence that will, in-turn, compel ethnic 
moderates to join ethnic extremists in their support of illiberal elites (as in Yugoslavia and 
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Rwanda).   In his examination of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, Kapferfer (1988), for example, 
explains how then-president of Sri Lanka, Jayawardene, tried to establish his own legitimacy as an 
extremist leader by organizing pogroms, alongside his ministers, against innocent Tamils (Fearon 
and Laitin 2000: 860).  Prunier’s (1995) account of the Rwandan genocide likewise explains that 
the leading Hutu extremists tried to cast the Tutsis as purely evil outsiders, and Hutu moderates as 
their stooges, by broadcasting calls to “vigilance” and murder against the “foreign Tutsi invaders” 
on their radio station, Radio-Television Libre des Mille.  And following in the footsteps of Brass 
(1997), Varshney (2002) and Wilkinson (2004) formulate explanations of Hindu-Muslim riots that 
emphasize the coordinated provocations of elites, particularly in areas of the country where 
intercommunal relations are weak and partisan incentives for minority inclusion are low.  They 
explain that, “… elite discourse on Hindu-Muslim communalism operates as a cover for the 
political ambitions of elites and as a smokescreen to draw attention away from the consequences 
for its people of the policies of the modern Indian state and its leaders (Fearon and Laitin 2000: 
864).”   
Stuart Kaufman’s (2001) theory of symbolic politics incorporates these constructivist 
elements together in a way that is most helpful for an explanation of ethnic xenophobic activity.  
According to Kaufman, elites activate emotionally potent, nationalized myths in order to incite 
hostilities between groups and unite the selectorate in fear or anger against perceived ethnic 
enemies.  Elites build these emotional, symbolic narratives by exploiting well-known, often 
polarizing, histories of triumph against- or defeat at the hands of- perceived enemies.  In very 
similar ways, elites frequently rely on national myth narratives of belonging, or foreignness, to 
unite coalitions of native supporters in their shared hatred and suspicion of migrants.  The aim, for 
anti-migrant elites in this case, is to inspire dilemmas of existential incompatibility in the minds of 
local citizens so that they qualify migrants as clear and present threats to their livelihoods and well-
being.  Elites engage in any number of mobilization activities to broadcast their pogroms and 
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coordinate the direction (and intensity) of hostilities, including working with local party officers to 
post intimidating anti-migrant signage in municipalities, or instructing police officers to publicly 
harass migrants and recruit civilian groups in these efforts.  In the case of Tanzania, for example, 
the dominant Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party employed a performance group called Tanzania 
One Theatre (TOT) to travel throughout local districts in and around the capital with dramatic 
portrayals of refugee violence and inundation.  In addition, CCM party leaders paid local radio 
stations around Dar es Salaam to play their campaign song, “CCM is Number One”- which includes 
references to ‘dangerous refugees’- at least once an hour each day.  Similarly in Switzerland in the 
early 1990s, the leader of the People’s Party- Christopher Blocher- announced a relentless 
campaign strategy to visit every district to fly his banner that read, “Immigrants threaten the Swiss 
way of life and the security and well-being of all its citizens” (Mazzoleni and Skenderovic 2010).  
Local People’s Party supporters made their own versions of the banner and brandished them on the 
sides of buildings, in public squares and attached them to the back of bicycles to ride throughout 
their towns and cities.   
The constructivist scholarship presents clear expectations for the incidents and intensity of ethnic 
xenophobic activity, which leads to the formation of the following proposition: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Increases in negative elite rhetoric toward migrants, increases the incidents 
and intensity of ethnic xenophobic activity.   
The Structural Determinants of Ethnic Xenophobic Activity 
Structuralist scholars, instead, focus on national, structural factors as the primary sources 
of explanation for ethnic hostilities or prejudice.  There are several possible structural contributors 
to ethnic tensions and conflict, including economic or political crises and social or demographic 
change.  In terms of explaining acts of intolerance against migrants, structural events or transitions 
can heighten native anxieties toward foreigners who are perceived as contributing to future 
uncertainties and loss, including workforce competition and access to social services or resources.  
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Rapid urbanization, for instance, as a structural-spatial event, brings crowds of urban settlers into 
cities at rates that can easily outpace infrastructural capacity, strap social services, raise rents, and 
flood the local jobs market with a surplus of labor.  The pressures of these circumstances are likely 
to exaggerate the frustrations that native urbanites cast toward non-native arrivals; especially if they 
perceive themselves to be in direct competition with migrants over urban entitlements or access to 
the conveniences of life in the city (Bayat 2010).   
 It was Fromm (1941) who first argued that dramatic structural change would produce mass 
feelings of insecurity and uncertainty which could- in turn- inspire illiberal attitudes and reactions 
toward those deemed responsible, in this case migrants.  Likewise, modern Frommian scholars 
claim that a lack of control over such structural circumstances and events contributes directly to 
the popularity of the Radical Right in Europe since people are looking for ways to exercise authority 
over national, or system-level, change that appears worrisome or dangerous (Mirisola 2014).  
Tendencies toward authoritarianism among native populations are central to these theorists; they 
explain that there are three dimensions of authoritarian behaviors that are most likely to surface- 
even in the most advanced democracies- and cluster under such structural strain and uncertainty: 
(1) authoritarian submission (a strong tendency to submit to authorities, which are perceived as 
established and legitimate in the society in which one lives); (2) authoritarian aggression (a general 
aggressiveness, perceived to be positively sanctioned by established authorities, directed against 
various people); and (3) conventionalism (a strong tendency to adhere to the social conventions, 
which are perceived as endorsed by the society and its established authorities) (Altemeyer and 
Hunsberger 1992, Funke 2005).   
 Economic shocks, for example- as mentioned in the previous chapter- are thought to have 
direct implications for illiberal attitudes and activisms against migrants.  As generations of scholars 
suggest, a declining economy is likely to build native resentments toward migrants, especially for 
low-income wage earners and social service recipients whose ‘niche overlap’ with migrant workers 
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is most often greater than that of other natives. Under these circumstances, native workers fear that 
migrants will displace them from the labor force, compete for social services and benefits, or drive 
native wage-rates down, resulting in the escalation of status fears and frustrations that are likely to 
increase illiberal inclinations toward migrants and contribute to demands of authoritative, and 
thereby xenophobic, action.     
 Other structural changes within society, such as a sudden increase in the numbers of 
migrant arrivals, can likewise raise native anxieties.  Such large-scale changes to the demographic 
(and spatial) landscape of a nation’s communities have far-reaching implications for the economic, 
political and societal status quo; this includes settlement (or residential) patterns, especially for 
local communities and neighborhoods that have been historically segregated from ethnic minorities 
and migrants.  Similar to what ethnic residential scholars claim, these dramatic changes can 
exacerbate existing social exclusions between migrant and native communities, and worsen 
forecasting error-potential with a higher frequency of impersonal, short-term encounters.  Without 
the development of meaningful relational ties to restrain ethnic stereotyping or threat perceptions, 
the boiling over of frustrations or resentments is likely to- once again- mobilize public demands to 
take action against migrants.    
 Elections- as structural transfers of political power- can also contribute to ethnic 
xenophobic activity by casting atmospheres of political uncertainty or anticipations of change 
across native societies.  The confusion and controversy involved in competitive politics is- in and 
of itself- stressful for nations to endure; add-in the incentives for elites to build winning coalitions 
of native voters at whatever costs, and the potential for conflict increases substantially.  This is 
particularly the case for ethnic xenophobic activity.  As elections approach and political 
uncertainties loom, migrants become focal points of native discontent over economic and social 
issues of all varieties, including rising crime rates, housing shortages and religious practices.  
Within this arena of expression, it is common for grievances to be mobilized into action among the 
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native selectorate—meaning that the number and intensity of ethnic xenophobic incidents is 
expected to increase.   
Each of these structuralist arguments presents clear expectations for the incidents and/or intensity 
of ethnic xenophobic activity.  In consideration of these claims, I present the following 
hypotheses: 
Structural Hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Increases in the structural dimensions of threat, increase the incidents and 
intensity of ethnic xenophobic activity.8 
 
3.3 An Integrated Theory of Structures and Symbols 
In answering the question regarding the causal mechanisms that lead to ethnic xenophobic 
activity, I develop a theoretical framework that integrates essential components of constructivist 
and structuralist theories.  These competing theories emphasize that elite rhetoric and structural 
dimensions of threat drive ethnic xenophobic activity, but provide incomplete explanations for the 
phenomenon. The theory that is advanced in this chapter is that structural dimensions of threat are 
converted into anti-migrant symbols by elites in order to mobilize ethnic xenophobic activity for 
political gain.  It is important to recognize that constructivist and structuralist scholars fall-short of 
this fully integrated explanation.  Out of the constructivist literature, Kaufman (2001) goes furthest 
in explaining that elites use historical symbols or threats to mobilize ethnic violence.  However, the 
specification of the prior structural threat dimensions are undefined.  Conversely, structuralist 
scholars theorize that the structural dimensions of threat have a direct effect on ethnic conflict and 
violence and largely ignore the mediating role of elite symbolism.   
                                                          
8 The structural dimensions of threat include: increased numbers of refugees, economic crises, political 
transition or crisis, and rapid urbanization.  This also includes transfers of power during election years that 
threaten incumbent political elites and provide opportunities for their opponents.   
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While both are necessary, neither is a complete or sufficient explanations of ethnic 
xenophobic activity.  It is only through the discursive power of elites that the structural dimensions 
of threat are translated into the symbols that provoke native intolerance and ethnic xenophobic 
activity.  Prior structural dimensions of threat will produce both violent and non-violent ethnic 
xenophobic activity when they are mediated by the symbolic, discursive rhetoric of elites.   
But exactly how does this causal mechanism unfold cross-nationally?  In their conversions 
of prior structural dimensions of threat into anti-migrant symbols, elites identify the most 
emotionally potent, low-cost narratives available.  The myths surrounding refugee threats are well-
established throughout history, and are versatile enough to mediate the meaning of a variety of 
different structural dimensions of threat within host countries of all types.  Elites persistently 
scapegoat refugees for unduly burdening the host state economy or for contributing to acts of 
terrorism and violence against native communities.  In the aftermath of a security event or political 
crisis, refugees are often portrayed as embodiments of the conflict from which they have fled and 
vessels through which radicalization (or violence) may be transmitted.  The image of the ‘refugee 
warrior’ using flight as an opportunity to carry-out political objectives abroad, or as a means to 
mobilize resources in exile, carries enough elements of truth in history to produce contemporary 
stereotypes and hyperbole of mysterious migrants from dangerous places (Young 1979, Lischer 
2008, Salehyan 2010).  As part of their opposition strategy, elites may also use refugees as 
indictments against existing leadership—especially in the context of competitive elections or 
during periods of large-scale refugee arrival.  This has become a common practice of elite members 
of the alternative (or ‘alt’) right in the United States and Europe.  But it is also increasingly apparent 
in developing host states such as Lebanon and Malaysia.  Many elites go so far as to claim that 
refugees are the panacea for all that is wrong with native lives (including all that has been or is 
anticipated to be lost); refugees are made emblems of the destructive- and dangerous- processes of 
globalization, regional interdependence, terrorism and disease.  Elites often resort to highly illiberal 
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methods of mobilization; including corruptive police and para-military practices, recruitment of 
vigilante groups, and broadcasting of bogus news stories. 
Beyond their prevalence and versatility, the costs of using refugee myths to mediate the 
meaning of these structural dimensions of threats is relatively low in most circumstances as well; 
due to the fact that refugees are excluded from host country politics and often, more broadly, from 
effective participation in civil society, elites are unlikely to be met with meaningful resistance or 
punishments if they pursue such symbolic ‘refugee threat’ maneuvers.   
Consider, for a moment, the Moscow theater siege as an example of this integrated 
approach.   The Moscow theater siege- in which some eight hundred people were held captive by 
Chechen rebels for five days in Russia’s national theater- took place nearly six months after 
President Putin declared an end to Russia’s war with Chechnya in 2002.  The forceful response of 
the Russian military to the siege inspired widespread uncertainty and concern over the state of 
Russian-Chechen relations, including Putin’s ability to keep his declarative promise of security and 
peace for the Russian people.  With major Federal Assembly elections on the horizon, in which the 
pro-Putin United Russia party stood to lose 450 seats in the lower house, Putin banded together 
with legislative allies to direct national energies toward ‘unknown foreign threats’ as perpetrators 
of the theater siege—casting these external forces as, “[L]ooming threats to the security of the 
people and the stability of the nation (Karon 2002).”  The campaign tapped into the myths of foreign 
terrorism and migration as a means of subversion and violence toward the daily life of Russian 
nationals.  In one of a series of public statements relating to the siege and the nearing election, a 
pro-Putin legislator remarked, “Global forces have brought the world’s people to our door, some 
of whom wish to do us significant harm as they have elsewhere.  It is prudent for us to remain 
united under the existing authorities of the nation in our resolve against such foreign elements 
(Oetgen and Balmforth 2012).”  The anti-foreigner message was successfully consolidated once 
the Kremlin shut down the only remaining source of nationwide, independent television news in 
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the country three months prior to the national election, and promised to “Take charge in the stand 
to protect and defend the homeland against foreign threats in Russia, many of which are worsened 
by the liberal opposition (Karon 2002).”  The 2003 Federal Assembly elections were reported as 
the most fraudulent in modern history, as the United Russia party took control of parliament by 
removing members of the opposition with physical force.  A survey released by the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) within the same year, showed a dramatic increase 
(upwards of sixty-percent) in the numbers of hospitalizations for refugees as a result of physical 
attacks.  Refugees from Afghanistan and a variety of African nations, especially Sudan, suffered 
the most numerous and serious injuries from assaults with crude weapons, such as metal chains and 
pipes.  A significant portion of the violence was centered in-and-around Moscow where the largest 
portion of self-settled urban refugees reside (Crush 2009).  Follow-up survey reports confirm rising 
trends of physical violence coordinated against refugee communities throughout the country 
(UNHCR 2009). 
Symbolic politics proved an effective strategy for Putin and the United Russia party in the 
aftermath of the theater siege as they faced electoral uncertainty.  By shifting post-siege anxieties 
onto foreign threats and resident refugees, the regime avoided undue scrutiny from the public in its 
control of the Chechen rebel threat and legitimated illiberal, authoritative actions in the take-over 
of parliament and the independent media as a response to the demands for safety and restorations 
of security.  The mobilization of ethnic xenophobic activity against refugees in Moscow was based 
on retaliatory rhetoric and a widespread belief in an existential foreign-turned-domestic threat.  The 
prior victimization of Russians in the siege further rationalized the emotional response of anti-
migrant groups who took to the streets to avenge their fellow patriots and to send a message of 
nationalist-preservation to those they deemed responsible.  An Afghan refugee victim of the 
xenophobic attacks provided the following anonymous statement, “They attacked me with metal 
chains, demanding that I confess to wanting to kill Russian people and kidnap their children (Crush 
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2009).” Despite all the public violence, the cost of continuing such anti-migrant mobilizations for 
the Kremlin elite remains relatively low since refugees have no direct political recourse and are- 
for the most part- highly isolated from Russian nationals in their day-to-day lives.   
This integrated theory is, however, less likely to explain ethnic xenophobic activity under 
conditions of socio-economic interdependence between refugees and native populations.  Chapter 
6 discusses in detail the case of the densely populated micro-city camps in northern Kenya, where 
refugees and natives experience high-levels of interconnection in their daily economic and 
household activities.  It is shown that locals have directly resisted the anti-migrant provocations of 
elites in these situations.  However, for the vast majority of cases, where refugee and host 
populations are not socially or economically interconnected, this integrative theory does explain 
the causal mechanisms that drive both violent and non-violent ethnic xenophobic activity.   
The theoretical discussion above generates the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Increases in the structural dimensions of threat will increase ethnic 
xenophobic activity (violent and non-violent) only when they are mediated through the anti-
migrant rhetoric of elites.  
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Chapter 4: Research Design and Methodology 
4.1 Introduction to the Research Design 
In order to test the hypotheses put forth in the previous chapter, this study employs a mixed-
methods approach.  First, I use an original cross-national dataset to analyze the determinants of 
ethnic xenophobic activity with two econometric estimators, a Heckman selection model and a 
structural equation model (SEM).  The dataset includes nearly 14,000 observations of ethnic 
xenophobic activity across seventy-eight host countries from 1990 to 2014. 9  The sample of host 
countries was determined- in part- by the availability of data for refugee populations during this 
twenty-four year period.  The primary data source for refugee statistics is the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Statistical Database.  Sample selection was also meant to 
establish a relatively even distribution of developed and developing countries within the dataset.  
The dataset includes observations for 36 developed host countries and 43 developing host countries 
in order to gauge cross-regional effects and trends relating to ethnic xenophobic activity (see 
Appendix A for a full list of countries).  The countries represent the following regions: Sub-Saharan 
Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Western Europe, and North America.  
The development of the dataset was guided in large part by the Minorities at Risk (MAR) 
Project Database (2009).  I followed many of the coding rules established by the MAR project and 
drew raw data from several of its primary sources.  I also relied heavily on its research protocols, 
including code-sheets, overviews, chronologies, and summaries.   
The general sources of information for the original variables listed below include world 
news sources in Lexis Nexis, the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) World Fact Book, country 
reports from the UN and various non-profit monitoring agencies, national crime statistic databases, 
and interviews with various stakeholders in positions with multilateral state and non-state migration 
                                                          
9 For a full list of all countries included in the sample please see Appendix B.  For my complete codebook 
please see Appendix C.   
 
 
36 
 
agencies.  Further information relating to specific sources for variable formation are included in 
the data descriptions below.   
Second, I use a Most Different Systems Design (MDSD) to examine two pairs of cases.  
The first set of cases includes Lebanon and the United States and the second set of cases includes 
Kenya and the Netherlands.  The objective of such a design is to illustrate how such seemingly 
different development contexts can converge on similar outcomes.  The technical aspects of this 
case study approach will be discussed thoroughly below.   
4.2 Estimation Models 
The Heckman Selection Model 
Since one of the main theoretical questions of this study relates to the determinants of the 
incidents and intensity of ethnic xenophobic activity, countries who experience an ethnic 
xenophobic incident are not random from those countries where ethnic xenophobic activities are 
intense.  To address this non-random selection bias in generating estimates, this study employs the 
Heckman selection estimator.  Factors that determine the intensity of ethnic xenophobic activity in 
stage two of the Heckman model is not a random process that is unaffected by factors that determine 
the probability of experiencing an ethnic xenophobic incident in stage one.  The first stage, or the 
selection stage, determines the characteristics that make incidents of ethnic xenophobic activity 
likely to occur.  Countries that pass through the selection phase are included in the second phase 
which determines the intensity of ethnic xenophobic activity.  Correcting for selection bias is 
important because certain observations are systematically censored and included in the second 
stage sub-sample by the preceding selection process.  Least-squared estimation among censored 
observation risks producing bias and inconsistent estimate in the second stage equation and could 
mislead the analyst into attributing causal effects to the central explanatory variables.  
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 Structural Equation Modeling 
 Since this study also concerns itself with the causal mechanisms through which anti-
migrant elite rhetoric is used to mediate the structural dimensions of threat, SEM which features a 
latent path analysis is used to estimate the data.  SEM allows multiple indicators that measure an 
unobserved latent variable.  By explicitly modeling measurement error, SEM produces unbiased 
estimates for the relationships between exogenous co-variates and the unobserved latent variable.   
4.3 Data Measurement  
Dependent Variable 
The primary variable to be explained in this project is ethnic xenophobic activity.  Ethnic 
xenophobic activity is operationalized as the following activities toward refugees (ranked least to 
most violent): protests, rallies, marches, imagery, demonstrations, campaigns, party formation, 
signage/brochures, broadcasts, taunts/threats, stalking, verbal confrontations, vandalism, theft, 
destruction of property (including arsons), physical assault, kidnapping, police brutality/harassment 
(including the use of tear-gas and spontaneous arrest/detention), sexual exploitation or abuse, gun 
and knife violence, group-based assault, mass weapon (or high casualty) violence.  In coding ethnic 
xenophobic activity, I relied heavily on world news sources in Lexis Nexis, country reports from 
the UN and various non-profit monitoring agencies, national crime statistic databases and event-
coding software (KEDS/TABARI).  In order to measure this phenomenon I have developed the 
following indicators: 
1. The incident of ethnic xenophobic activity.  This is a dichotomous variable measuring 
whether or not an ethnic xenophobic incident occurred within the country-year.  The 
variable is coded 1 if an ethnic xenophobic incident is reported, and 0 otherwise.   
2. Ethnic xenophobic intensity.  This is a count variable of the number of incidents of non-
violent and violent ethnic xenophobic activity within a country-year.  Incidents of non-
violent xenophobic activity include: protests, rallies, harassment, stalking, the distribution 
of pamphlets or imagery (including graffiti or graphic expression), and verbal 
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confrontations. Incidents of violent ethnic xenophobic activity include: vandalism, theft, 
destruction of property (including arsons), physical assault, kidnapping, police 
brutality/harassment (including the use of tear-gas and spontaneous arrest/detention), 
sexual exploitation or abuse, gun and knife violence, group-based assault, mass weapon 
(or high casualty) violence.  This variable is not normally distributed and therefore would 
bias regression estimates.  The variable is therefore transformed as a natural log.   
The dependent variable in the SEM, is the latent variable, ethnic xenophobic activity.  This is 
comprised of the following indicators:  
a. Non-violent ethnic xenophobic activity. This is a count variable of the number of 
instances of non-violence ethnic xenophobic activity that occurred within a 
country-year.   
b. Violent ethnic xenophobic activity.  This is a count variable of the number of 
instances of non-violence ethnic xenophobic activity that occurred within a 
country-year.  Incidents of violent ethnic xenophobic activity include: vandalism, 
theft, destruction of property (including arsons), physical assault, kidnapping, 
police brutality/harassment (including the use of tear-gas and spontaneous 
arrest/detention), sexual exploitation or abuse, gun and knife violence, group-
based assault, mass weapon (or high casualty) violence. 
Co-Variates 
Both the Heckman selection model and the SEM, use the same exogenous co-variates that 
measure different dimensions of structural threat.  In this study, I theorize that ethnic xenophobic 
activity is driven by these structural dimensions of threat as they are mediated by the anti-migrant 
rhetoric of elites.  Drawing from constructivist and structuralist theories, the following co-variates 
that measure these structural dimensions of threat are included in the statistical analyses.   
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Anti-migrant elite rhetoric.  This is an original variable that captures the number of negative 
references to refugees made by host country elites within a given year.  I used critical content 
analysis to hand-code public statements of host country elites from world news sources, 
unclassified country reports from the UN and other agencies, as well as interviews with state and 
non-state representatives.  Host state elites include: heads of state, legislative members, judicial 
officials, high-ranking religious officials, military officials, state agency representatives, local 
elected officials, cabinet members, royal family members, primary business leaders, and diplomats. 
The hand-coded variable was cross-checked with an open-source content analysis software, 
KEDS/TABARI.  I have set forth the expectation that negative elite discourse regarding refugees 
and migrants increases the likelihood of both violent and non-violent ethnic xenophobic activity.  
In specific causal terms, this variable is seen as a mediator between structural events or change and 
ethnic xenophobic activity. 
Election year.  I use IDEA election data to indicate whether there is an election within a country 
year.  This is a dichotomous measure, coded 0 if no election occurred and 1 if an election took 
place.  The existing literature explains that elections increase the likelihood of ethnic conflict or 
tension because competing elites will use divisive politics to build winning coalitions around 
conflicting identity structures.  This project incorporates a similar argument—that elections provide 
incentives for elites to engage in symbolic politics against migrants to unite native voters in support 
of illiberal, and xenophobic, activity, especially when the uncertainties of elections produce 
anxieties among native populations.   
Number of refugees.  The UNHCR reports refugee figures for host countries worldwide.  These 
statistics are available for most countries since 1990.  I use this continuous variable to measure the 
number of refugees for each host country-year.  Contact theorists explain that larger numbers of 
migrants increase the likelihood of intergroup interaction with native groups.  However, these 
interactions are not always positive and do not encourage long-term positive relationships, 
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especially since refugees tend to be highly isolated from natives in their daily lives because of urban 
settlement patterns and host state restrictions on integration (such as rights to work). 
State Fragility Index (SFI).  This index serves is a proxy for the political, economic and social 
dimensions of threat.  The Center for Systemic Peace’s SFI (1995-2014) provides annual state 
fragility, effectiveness and legitimacy indices along with the eight component indicators for the 
world’s 167 countries with populations greater than 500,000.  The Fragility Matrix scores each 
country on both effectiveness and legitimacy in four performance dimensions: security, political, 
economic, and social.  Each of the matrix indicators is rated on a four-point fragility scale: 0 “no 
fragility”, 1 “low fragility”, 2 “medium fragility”, and 3 “high fragility” with the exception of the 
economic effectiveness indicator which is rated on a five-point scale (including 4 “extreme 
fragility”).  The SFI then combines scores of eight indicators and ranges from 0 “no fragility” to 
25 “extreme fragility”.  Countries that have high levels of fragility are also countries that have high 
levels of political, economic, and social dimensions of threat.  
Urban population.  This variable captures the perceived or actual competition between native 
populations and refugees over scarce urban resources such as housing, jobs and social services.  
The variable represents a demographic dimension of threat that would produce anxiety among 
native groups and provide opportunities for political elites to exploit public uncertainty by using 
anti-migrant rhetoric.  The variable measures the percent of urban population across countries and 
is taken from the United Nations Population Database (UNPD) for the years 1990 through 2014.   
Social Globalization.  This variable is not a dimension of structural threat.  It is included in the 
statistical analyses as a control variable that is hypothesized to have a direct negative effect on 
ethnic xenophobic activity.  I argue that countries that have high levels of social globalization, 
represent societies with high degrees of transnational interdependence.  It is recognized in the 
international relations literature that high levels of economic interdependence reduce the likelihood 
of war and conflict between nation-states (Oneal and Russett 1997, Oneal and Russett 1999).  This 
 
 
41 
 
insight may also predict intra-social relations within states.  That is to say, that in countries where 
there are high degrees of transnational interdependence along cultural, technological, and personal 
lines we should expect that the transnationalization of social life will become a bulwark against 
ethnic xenophobic activity.   The social globalization measure is adopted from the KOF 
Globalization Index and includes data on personal contact (including telephone traffic, transfers, 
international tourism, foreign population, and international letters), data on information flows 
(internet users, television, trade in newspapers) and data on cultural proximity (number of 
McDonald’s Restaurants, number of IKEA, and trade in books).  The data is transformed to an 
index on a scale of 1 to 100, where 100 is the maximum value and 1 is the minimum value.  Higher 
values denote greater social globalization. The variable approximates the interconnectedness of 
transnational societies.   
4.4 Case Selection Methodology 
A Most Different System Design (MDSD) compares as contrasting cases as possible in 
order to show the robustness of a relationship between dependent and independent variables 
(Przeworski and Teune 1970).  Such a design assumes that by demonstrating that the observed 
relationships hold in a range of contrasting settings the argument of the research is better supported.  
The outcome variable is the same across cases.  The objective of this comparative approach is to 
appreciate the complexity across cases, unravel historical conditions, and illustrate the 
operationalization of the primary independent variables across disparate contexts.  The logic of 
MDSD is that differences cannot explain similarities; therefore, similar outcomes of interest across 
contexts are explained by similar explanatory factors across such contexts.  Here, MDSD is useful 
as a tool of discovery—particularly as it relates to underappreciated similarities in the casual 
pathways of ethnic xenophobic activity across different regions.  The pairs of cases included in the 
MDSD in this project include: Kenya and the Netherlands and Lebanon and the United States.  All 
cases experience positive outcomes of the dependent variable.  Otherwise, their differences are 
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apparent.  These cases were chosen because of my immediate familiarity and experience in the 
respective countries over the past decade, including field research experience and valuable internal 
contacts both inside and outside official state positions.  Another determining factor for case 
selection was the availability and access to information, particularly as it relates to hate crime 
statistics and descriptions of xenophobic incidents.  Data sources, including unclassified 
government documents and archived journalistic accounts, were very comparable in accessibility 
and availability across states.  The selected countries are also not connected directly through 
colonialism or unilateral political (or military) occupation.   
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Chapter 5: Cross-National and Country Level Assessments of Ethnic Xenophobic Activity 
 
This chapter discusses the results from the two-stage Heckman selection model and SEM.  
The chapter is organized as follows: the next section discusses the results of the Heckman model 
and this is followed by a discussion of the SEM results and goodness of fit statistics.  The chapter 
concludes by considering the implications of these findings for constructivist and structuralist 
theories of ethnic xenophobia.   
5.1 The Determinants of Ethnic Xenophobic Activity  
Table 5.1 presents estimates from the Heckman model of ethnic xenophobic activity in a 
sample of seventy-two countries.  Models 1, 2, 3, respectively, provide estimates for all countries, 
developed countries, and developing countries.  To control for the problem of heteroscedasticity in 
both the selection and the intensity equations, the regression coefficients are accompanied by robust 
standard errors that cluster on country.  In all models, the Wald Test of the independence of the 
equations is statistically significant, indicating that selection equations and intensity equations are 
correlated.  In other words, the countries selection into the sample at stage two is not a random 
process that is unaffected by factors that determine the likelihood of an ethnic xenophobic incident 
at stage one.  The Heckman technique is therefore the appropriate remedy for correcting selection 
bias when estimating the determinants of ethnic xenophobic activity.   
 In all models, election year, elite rhetoric and the number of refugees not only increase the 
probability that an ethnic xenophobic activity will occur in the selection equation, but they all 
increase the intensity of ethnic xenophobic activity in stage two (the intensity equation).  While 
increases in the percent of the country’s urban population fails to rise to the level of statistical 
significance in models 1 and 2, and reduces the probability of countries experiencing an ethnic 
xenophobic incident in model 3, it has a significant, positive effect on the intensity of ethnic 
xenophobic activity in all models in the second equation.  Increasing levels of the fragility of states 
 
 
44 
 
increases the probability of an ethnic xenophobic incident across all models as theorized.  This 
variable is dropped in the second, intensity equation to correct for sampling selectivity.  Increases 
in social globalization reduce the probability of an ethnic xenophobic activity across all models in 
the selection equation, and also fails to rise to the level of statistical significance in the intensity 
equation.  
 
 
Table 5.1  
The Determinants of Ethnic Xenophobic Activity 
Stage One: The Selection (or ‘Incident’) Equation 
 
 
Explanatory Variable 
Model 1 
ALL HOST 
STATES 
Model 2 
DEVELOPED 
HOST STATES 
Model 3 
DEVELOPING 
HOST STATES 
Election Year  0.293*** 
(0.0606) 
0.372*** 
(0.0970)  
0.283*** 
(0.0751)  
Anti-migrant Elite Rhetoric 0.000531*** 
(0.0000931) 
0.000224*** 
(0.0000646)  
0.000740*** 
(0.0000154)   
Number of Refugees 0.000000548*** 
(0.000000121) 
 0.00000112*** 
(0.000000168) 
0.000000506*** 
(4.93e-08) 
Urban Population Percentage 0.000536 
(0.00223) 
0.00612 
(0.00553) 
-0.00300* 
(0.0029) 
State Fragility Index (SFI) 
 
0.00312*** 
(0.000623) 
0.00276* 
(0.00111) 
0.00341*** 
(0.000760) 
Social Globalization 
 
-0.00135* 
(0.000678) 
-0.00187* 
(0.000731) 
-0.00189+ 
(0.000122) 
Constant 1.647*** 
(0.127)  
1.326*** 
(0.450) 
1.744*** 
(0.0717)  
Number of Observations at the Selection Stage 1617 320   1297 
Stage Two: The Intensity Equation 
 
 
 
Explanatory Variables 
Model 1 
ALL HOST 
STATES 
Model 2 
DEVELOPED 
HOST STATES 
Model 3 
DEVELOPING 
HOST STATES 
Election Year 0.421*** 
(0.105) 
0.1550 
(81.43)  
0.449** 
(0.114)  
Anti-migrant Elite Rhetoric 0.00306* 
(0.00144) 
0.0187+ 
(0.0113)  
0.00250** 
(0.000134)  
Number of Refugees 0.0000314*** 
(0.0000887) 
0.00000231*** 
(0.00000438) 
0.0000415*** 
(0.00000115)  
Urban Population Percentage 0.00760** 
(0.00286) 
0.0206* 
(0.0170) 
0.00875*** 
(0.00335)  
Social Globalization -0.00309 
(0.00188) 
0.00427 
(0.00547) 
-0.00257 
(0.00221)  
Constant -0.492** 
(.185) 
2.263** 
(1.459) 
-6.37*** 
(0.130)  
Number of Observations at the Intensity Stage 1384 313 1071 
Heckman Model Chi-Square  178.59*** 9.21** 194.33*** 
Wald Test of Independent Equations, Chi-Square 149.42*** 127.78*** 133.86** 
Robust Standard errors in parentheses + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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5.2 The Causal Pathways to Ethnic Xenophobic Activity    
The SEM presented below represents the causal pathways that lead to ethnic xenophobic 
activity (Pearl 2000).  The results of the SEM are presented in Figure 1 as well as Table 5.2 which 
features goodness of fit statistics. Estimates of the data support the integrated theoretical approach 
to ethnic xenophobic activity. The dimensions of structural threats’ effect on ethnic xenophobic 
activity are all mediated by anti-migrant elite rhetoric.  There are also important theoretical 
additions, the effect that the number of refugees has on ethnic xenophobia is not only mediated by 
elite rhetoric, but it also has a direct effect in increasing both violent and non-violent ethnic 
xenophobic activity.  Increasing levels of social globalization have direct, reductive effects on 
ethnic xenophobic activity.  This suggests that high levels of transnational personal contact, 
information flows, and cultural proximity to other countries in the international system provides 
the context of transnational interdependencies that reduce ethnic xenophobic activity. 
Figure 5.1 Structural Equation Model Diagram 
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Table 5.2 provides the same results of the SEM figure discussed above.  It also provides 
details on the goodness of fit statistics for the model.   
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.2 
SEM Cross-National Analysis of Ethnic Xenophobic Activity 
Dependent Variables in Bold Face  
Explanatory Variables Below 
Estimates of the Structural Model 
Anti-migrant Elite Rhetoric  
Urban Population .093*** (.023) 
Election Year .199*** (.023) 
State Fragility Index .069** (.023) 
Refugee Number .022*** (.022) 
Constant -.011 (.06) 
Ethnic Xenophobic Activity (violent)   
Ethnic Xenophobic Activity (latent) .84*** (.023) 
Refugee Number .277*** (.022) 
Constant .25*** (.031) 
Ethnic Xenophobic Activity (non-violent)  
Ethnic Xenophobic Activity (latent)                    .92*** (.024) 
Refugee Number .28*** (.022) 
Constant .485*** (.032) 
Ethnic Xenophobic Activity (latent)  
Anti-migrant Elite Rhetoric .269*** (.024) 
Social Globalization -.123*** (.024) 
Constant  
Number of Observations 1,623 
Standard errors in parentheses:  
Levels of statistical significant: *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001 
Goodness of Fit Statistics 
Model chi-square: p>χ2 = .0000  
Population error: Root Mean Squared Error Approximation (RMSEA) = .073 
Baseline comparison:  Comparative Fit Index = .97; Tucker-Lewis Index= .95 
Size of residuals: Standardized Root Mean Squared Residual (SRMR) = .04 
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How well do the data fit the model?  With the exception of the chi-square, the model fits 
the data very well.  Although the chi-square statistic is significant, it suggests that the model is not 
properly fitted for the data, the chi-square estimation is considered to be a weak indicator of model 
fit, especially for large sample sizes (which is the case here) (Rasch 1980).  In general, large sample 
sizes will cause most chi-square-based statistics to almost always report a statistically significant 
difference between the observed data and model expectation, suggesting misfit, regardless of the 
true situation (resulting in Type 1 error).  One potential mechanism for accommodating large 
sample sizes (of 500 or more) is to use the Root Mean Squared Error of Approximation (RMSEA).  
The RMSEA is widely used in SEM to provide a mechanism for adjusting for sample size where 
chi-square statistics are used.   Here, the RMSEA is reported as 0.07 which suggests a good fit, 
with only a ten percent margin of a misfit of the data to the model.  The closer the RMSEA is to 
zero, the better the fit; and most values that fall below 1 are considered acceptable.  Likewise, the 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) approaches its upper boundary of 1 (at .97), suggesting an acceptable 
model fit.10  Finally, the Standardized Root Mean Squared Residual (SRMSR) provides another 
strong confirmation of fit at 0.04.  The SRMSR is an absolute measure of fit and is defined as the 
standardized difference between the observed correlation and the predicted correlation.  A value of 
zero is considered a perfect fit, which the statistic approaches here (Bentler and Chou 1987).  
5.3 The Implications of the Findings for Constructivist and Structuralist Scholarship  
This research presents an integrated theoretical approach to ethnic xenophobic activity, but 
this approach is based on the factors first developed in the constructivist and structuralist 
scholarship (as discussed throughout chapters 2 and 3).  One of the primary goals of this study is 
to determine which theoretical framework provides the most effective explanation of ethnic 
xenophobic activity, constructivists or structuralist.   
                                                          
10 Typically only one of the two fit indices are reported—either the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) or the 
Tucker-Lewis Index (TFI).  The CFI is more often reported because of its interpretability.  I choose to follow 
this convention here.  The CFI and TLI are highly correlated estimators of fit.   
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 According to the results presented in this chapter, it appears that both explanations have 
merit.  The main indicator of the constructivist argument- anti-migrant elite rhetoric- is shown to 
be a central explanatory variable of ethnic xenophobic activity.  This means that the myths and 
symbols used by elites to antagonize migrants do significantly increase the likelihood of ethnic 
xenophobic activity.  For structuralist scholars, elections, the number of refugees, and state fragility 
all influence the incidents and intensity of ethnic xenophobic activity.  Although urbanization is 
found to have mixed results for the occurrence of ethnic xenophobic incidents in stage one of the 
Heckman model, it is found to be a significant determinant of intensity in the second stage.   
 However, the results of the SEM confirm that both constructivist and structuralist claims 
are crucial for a comprehensive explanation of the causal mechanisms and pathways of ethnic 
xenophobic activity.  Structuralist variables- including elections, number of refugees and state 
fragility- effect ethnic xenophobic activity to the degree that they are mediated through the anti-
migrant rhetoric of elites.  Therefore, Kaufman (2001) correctly theorizes that the symbolic 
discourse of elites serves as an intermediary of threats and violence; but this research presents clear 
evidence that the specification of the structural dimensions of the threats used by elites in their 
exploits matters a great deal as will be further illustrated in the case studies below.     
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Chapter 6: Cross-Regional Comparative Case Studies: the Most Different Contexts of 
Ethnic Xenophobic Activity 
6.1 Introduction and Case Structure 
This chapter develops two pairs of cases in order to provide further insight into the causal 
mechanisms of ethnic xenophobic activity across regional contexts. The pairs of cases are 
compared using a most-different systems case design (as described in the final section of Chapter 
4).  The first pair of cases includes Kenya and the Netherlands (6.2).  The second pair of case 
studies includes Lebanon and the United States (6.3).  Each case study features an extensive review 
of the country’s history of refugee settlement as well as the policy regimes that govern the rights 
and privileges of refugees.  In addition, each case includes discussion of a structural event that is 
then portrayed, by elites, as somehow connected to the ‘refugee threat’.  Elite mobilizations are 
shown to take place across a variety of similar planes, including political party structures and 
through police or security forces.  The purpose of these cases is to sharpen the identification of the 
shared patterns and processes of ethnic xenophobic activity across vastly different regional 
contexts.  In short, similar mechanisms- operating within these four diverse fields of consideration- 
lead to similar outcomes.   
6.2 Kenya and the Netherlands 
CASE 1: Kenya: Background and Settlement Context 
For nearly a quarter of a century, Kenya has played a vital role as a primary first-country 
of asylum for forcibly displaced people and populations of concern within the region.  Beginning 
in 1971, Kenya experienced its first major influx of refugees from Uganda.  Nearly 20,000 
Ugandans self-settled in Kenya and were largely integrated into economic and social life without 
significant policy resistance or local opposition.  But conflicts throughout the 1990s placed Kenya 
at the center of unprecedented receiving efforts for massive movements of refugees from the Great 
Lakes countries, East Africa and the Horn.  Between 1991 and 1992, Kenya’s refugee population 
soared from 14,500 to 400,000 thanks, in large part, to an “arc of instability” to the north that 
spanned from Somalia to Sudan.  The enormous scale of refugee arrivals occurred just as the 
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country was grappling with major political transitions, including the formulation of its own multi-
party political system.  The influx of refugees- particularly in the North Eastern province- placed 
significant strain on the liberalizing nation, forcing the Government of Kenya (GoK) to rely on 
emergency intervention and assistance from the UNHCR.  The establishment of large ‘temporary’ 
camps and registration processes soon followed. Through this coordination, Kenya rapidly gained 
recognition from the international community as one of the most flexible and accommodating host 
countries on the continent.  And despite hardships, mistakes, and noteworthy imperfections, the 
GoK was seen as a generous- and eager- partner in multilateral arrangements with the UNHCR and 
other leading humanitarian agencies.  Throughout the 90s and early 2000s, the GoK relied heavily 
on the UNHCR- including their subcontracting agencies- to manage the camps, determine the status 
of new arrivals, and make decisions relating to camp capacity and appropriate levels of response.  
Occasional upheavals did occur—particularly in the form of GoK policy threats of camp closure 
and flare-ups of hostility between locals and refugees (and between refugee communities) within 
the camps.  Instability within the camps and surrounding areas tended to rise and fall in accordance 
with the numbers of arrivals and departures, cross-border incursions or security events relating to 
neighboring country conflicts near the northern camps, and host country elections.  For example in 
2011, when the population of refugees swelled by nearly 10,000 arrivals in a single month in one 
of the northwestern camps, protests broke out among refugees over the crowded conditions and 
lack of sufficient food or housing; security forces responded by firing on refugee crowds.   
As of October 2016, Kenya ranked seventh out of the top ten refugee hosting nations 
worldwide, with nearly 600,000 registered refugees residing in the country (International 2016, 
UNHCRa 2016). The majority of resident refugees are settled in one of three primary locations 
throughout the country: Kakuma Camp in the Northwest district of Turkana approximately 100 
kilometers from the Sudanese border; Dadaab and Alinjugar Camps in the North East, 100 
kilometers from the border with Somalia; and the capital city of Nairobi in the Southwest.  Somali 
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refugees constitute nearly half of Kenya’s refugee population (332,785 registered as of November 
2016), with large populations distributed across all settlement locations.  Refugees from South 
Sudan number over 90,000 and reside mainly in the Kakuma camps.  Refugees from Ethiopia and 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) rank third in resident numbers, with large settlement 
clusters in and around Nairobi (ReliefWeb 2016, UNHCRb 2016). 
 
 Map of Kenya Refugee Settlements: (UNHCRe 2016) 
Overall, the number of registered refugees in Kenya has declined by over 90,000 in the 
past year (2015 to 2016); this is mainly due to large-scale (and controversial) ‘voluntary’ 
repatriation programs for Somali refugees in Dadaab and Kakuma camps.  The figure may also 
represent the persistent rise in urban self-settlement for refugees who are either not registered with 
the UNHCR/GoK or who leave their registered camps for a growing number of refugee 
communities in Nairobi.  Kenya has experienced dramatic growth in the estimated number of 
refugees in urban areas; the pace and scale of urban arrivals are expected to increase exponentially 
as northern camps face pending closures and as the GoK hardens its resettlement policies toward 
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resident refugees who are forced to pursue work ‘illegally’ in one of three primary areas of Nairobi 
(Eastleigh, Koyole, or Kitengela).   
The GoK established the Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA) within the Ministry of Interior 
to manage and coordinate refugee issues.  And since the Refugee Act of 2006, the DRA- in 
coordination with the UNHCR- has been the main government actor involved in the registration 
and status determination of refugees.  The DRA is additionally responsible for overseeing and 
affirming the GoK’s commitment to international refugee conventions (including the recognition 
of asylum seekers, their protection from arbitrary arrest, and their rights to economic and productive 
activities) (Act" 2006, UNHCR-DRC 2012). As a part of this mandate, the DRA issues Alien 
Refugee Certificates (ARCs) to newly registered arrivals for five year permitted residence in the 
country.  Most ARCs are limited to residence in one of the two primary refugee camps.  A separate 
process is required through the DRA for a ‘Class M’ refugee work permit—which confers the right 
to employment for refugees in Kenya.  Such permits require special status designation and are 
rarely granted. 
Kenya: Local Perceptions, Police Treatment and Policy Frameworks 
The Camps 
The Northern border camps- in both Dadaab and Kakuma- are active micro-cities, 
approximately the size of New Orleans or Zurich, that remain unmarked on any official map.11  For 
over twenty-five years, these camps- including their residents, surrounding local communities, and 
the systems of relief and security- have incubated the development of complex economic, social, 
and political relationships in a strange limbo of life.12  There are cinemas, soccer leagues, hotels 
and hospitals indicating the permanence of life, contrasted by the near-constant patrolling of 
Kenyan security forces attempting to contain- or capitalize upon- what were intended to be 
                                                          
11 Dadaab includes 3 camps: Ifo, Dagahaley, and Hagadera. 
12 The term ‘displacement economies’ has been applied in an attempt to describe the new physical, social, 
economic and political spaces, relations, systems and practices that displacement itself produces in such 
settings (Hammar 2014).   
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temporary systems of aid and assistance.  Neither the GoK nor the UNHCR admits that the 
temporary settlements have taken on increasingly permanent qualities in contradiction to their 
intended purpose.  This paradox characterizes many of the formal policies of camp management, 
including the absence of any meaningful integration programs on behalf of both the GoK and the 
UNHCR.  Resident refugees are not permitted to leave the designated camp areas to pursue 
employment opportunities, visit relatives, or engage in travel within Kenya of any kind without 
specialized travel documents.  Income is based on the rations refugees receive from the UNHCR 
in coordination with other aid agencies, including the World Food Program (WFP).  Rations are a 
primary source of currency and trade within the camps, both between refugees and with local 
communities and merchants.  The food sold by refugees is among the cheapest in all of Kenya 
which has supplied a reasonably sized population of ‘aid entrepreneurs’ with food products that 
can be sold at much higher prices both in and around the camps and elsewhere.  The agencies within 
the camps are not permitted to hire refugees, and rely instead on local Kenyans as a main source of 
labor for positions within the WFP warehouses or lower-level UNHCR field posts.  The 
surrounding markets in Dadaab, for example, are sources of black market labor and goods for 
refugees and locals alike.  Refugee men (and boys) take jobs with local merchants and shop keepers 
as couriers and porters, driving over-loaded wheelbarrows full of merchandise from one end of the 
crowded market to another.  Women are typically in charge of overseeing the trading of rations and 
the transactions (including informal savings groups’ arrangements) involved in making household 
purchases or securing necessary goods.  A 2011 impact study estimated that the local host 
community in Dadaab earns approximately 1.8 million (USD) from the sale of livestock or 
slaughter in the camps on a yearly basis.  The total annual turnover of ‘camp business’ is about 25 
million (USD) and the market shops are estimated at close to 2 million (USD).  The same study 
found that the camps provided about 14 million (USD) in total economic benefit to the host 
community (UNHCRc 2014).  The camps, then, are central to an alternative economy of 
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displacement for hundreds of thousands of refugees, locals, government officials, and aid agencies 
throughout the otherwise inhospitable northern territories of the country.   
 
      Map of Dadaab (IFO) Camp in Northwestern Kenya: UNHCR 2014 
  
 
Map of Kakuma Camp: UNHCR 2011 
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The interdependencies produce complex social dynamics, however, between refugees and 
host communities particularly as issues relating to security and resource shortages intervene.  The 
refugees in Dadaab, for example, outnumber locals in the area by a quarter of a million at least.  
Locals and refugees compete, sometimes fiercely, over access to grazing land—particularly during 
long periods of drought.  Water in the area is also seen as a major drawcard.  Dadaab- and its 
surrounding districts, including Liboi near the Somali border, have far more boreholes than the 
neighboring areas.  But many host communities pay for water to fund the fueling and maintenance 
of the pumps in order for refugees to receive water access for free; which has produced ill feelings 
toward camp residents.  This speaks to broader resentments of the local host population with respect 
to resource allocation and assistance to refugees— particularly since both the Turkana district 
(where the Kakuma camps are located) and Dadaab have been historically marginalized and under-
represented on the national political stage.  Much of the local perception is that many non-refugee 
nationals have fraudulently registered as refugees to access the benefits of the camp, especially 
with the prolongation of drought seasons, which stirs issues of legitimacy and access to ‘free’ 
services.   
Locals in both Turkana and Dadaab are not surprised by the insecurity of the camps, or 
their tactical value for the cross-border activities of extremists and rebel militia.  In fact, locals are, 
in many cases, more inclined to talk of insecurities as they arise from the GoK’s complicity and 
incompetence than to rest such externalities on the shoulders of resident refugees.  For example, a 
2012 survey of nearly 2,000 local Turkana surrounding Kakuma camps reveals that attitudes toward 
the Kenyan government are generally far more negative than attitudes toward refugees, particularly 
involving issues relating to camp and border security (Aukot 2003).  A similar study in Dadaab 
finds that district locals, likewise, identify the government (more often than they do refugees) as 
the main arbiter of insecurity and violence (Crisp 2003).   
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Police and security officials are placed in relatively unlimited and ill-monitored positions 
of authority and access.  Reports of rape and harassment by police and security officials are routine.  
Bribery and police corruption for movement in and out of the camps as well as access to resources 
or merchandise are likewise common.  In a 2013 interview with a Dadaab resident, he recounted 
his own personal experience with security officials, “Everyone knows that the police laugh and call 
undocumented refugees ‘ATM machines’.  After crossing the border in a sugar-truck on my way 
to Ifo [one of camps in Dadaab], police stopped me and told me that I must empty my pockets and 
surrender all my valuables to them in order to pass through. Of course, I did (Rawlence 2016).”  
Security in and around the camps became a focal point of attention throughout the country 
when, on 2 April 2015, gunmen stormed the campus of Garissa University College in Garissa 
district near the northern camps.  One hundred and forty-seven people were killed in one of the 
deadliest attacks in the country’s history, falling nearly a year and a half after the fatal attacks at 
the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi.  The GoK immediately claimed that the Garissa gunmen 
were al-Shabaab recruits from the camps in Dadaab, and vowed to close the refugee camps since 
they had become ‘nurseries for terrorists’ (Thurston 2016).13  Locals in Nairobi were especially 
reactive in their calls for camp closures and the expulsion of refugees throughout the country, 
including the growing communities of refugees in and around the city.  
The City 
As of 2014, over 60,000 refugees were registered with the UNHCR in and around 
Nairobi.14  Unofficial estimates place this figure closer to 100,000.  Registration officials estimate 
that between 300 to 500 new refugees arrive into the city each day.  In Nairobi, refugees are 
dispersed throughout the city, often highly mobile and reluctant to come forward to register for 
                                                          
13 Reports indicate that al-Shabaab, a Somali militant group, is recruiting young men in the Dadaab camps.  
The GoK is accused of similar recruitments on behalf of the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG), 
and is claiming UN and international backing despite the fact that recruitment within the camps violates 
international law (HRW 2009).   
14 This figure includes refugees settled in Mombasa, Kisumu, Kisii, and Nakuru.   
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support or inquire into residency requirements because they fear deportation or worse.  There are 
three main concentrations of refugee communities in the city.  The largest of these communities is 
Eastleigh in central Nairobi, with large populations of Somali and Ethiopian refugees.  Refugees 
from Uganda, Rwanda, Congo, Sudan, Eritrea and Burundi live in other predominately low-income 
sectors of the city including Kayole and Kitengela.   
There is a great deal of confusion with respect to the legal status of urban refugees.  The 
Refugee Act of 2006 was intended to set out an institutional framework for the management of 
refugee affairs; but the GoK has left the details of this framework unclear and has not taken any 
action to bolster institutional capacity or protection efforts within the city.  In practice, this means 
that many refugees have different types of documentation and remain unsure of what papers they 
should apply for or how to apply for them.15  The confusion further compounds fear of spontaneous 
detention or deportation, with virtually no available recourse; especially since the GoK announced 
in 2013 that its registration of urban refugees would cease and ordered all refugees to move to the 
northern camps.  It also means that most refugees are forced to pursue livelihood opportunities in 
the informal sector, and to live as much as possible ‘under the radar’ of detection of authorities or 
locals.  Therefore, refugees in Nairobi remain highly isolated and ‘hidden’ from mainstream 
Kenyan life; there is an enormous degree of segregation between local Kenyans and refugees, with 
high levels of reported avoidance of refugee areas among the native host population.   
Refugees in Nairobi attest to deep-rooted suspicions and negative perceptions of refugees 
among police officers in the city.  There is widespread belief within the police ranks that refuges 
should be restricted to camps; and that those who self-settle in the city are either criminally minded 
or have links with terror organizations (this perspective is especially targeted toward Somalis) 
                                                          
15 As part of the registration and status determination process for refugees, the following documents are 
required: Asylum Seeker Certificate; Refugee Identification Pass; Movement Pass; Alien Cards; 
Appointment Letter; UNHCR Mandate Refugee Certificates; class M work permit.  Many urban refugees do 
not formally register with the UNHCR in order to receive documentation (due to fear of arrest or detention); 
there is a large counterfeit market for these documents in Eastleigh as well.   
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(Pavanello, Elhawary et al. 2010).  A series of recent focus group discussions with refugee 
communities in Eastleigh revealed widespread patterns of abuse and extortion, with refugees being 
routinely stopped, arrested and charged wit16h one of several crimes: ‘idling with intent of 
committing a crime’; ‘unlawful presence’; or being ‘illegally outside a designated area’.  These 
arrests are almost always made with the intention of seeking a bribe—according to local sources, 
police patrols are arranged to maximize bribe-taking and to inflate rates of detention which are part 
of city police performance evaluations.  The International Rescue Committee (IRC) country 
director in Nairobi, Kellie Leeson, revealed that refugees, ‘…report constant harassment from the 
police—from officers demanding financial bribes to physical beatings and intimidation.  Some 
refugee communities have even come together and organized monthly financial collections, which 
they pay to police to prevent such harassment (Leeson 2015).”   
Criminal violence toward refugees is also a significant threat, particularly from the Mungiki 
gang, a politico-religious group characterized by a revolutionary ideology based on a return to 
Kikuyu traditions and opposition to modernization.  But there is urgent, and increasing, concern 
regarding the rapid rise in reported generalized incidents of xenophobic attacks against refugees in 
Eastleigh and elsewhere.  A local staff member of a refugee NGO in Nairobi remarked, “There is 
a growing perception, among authorities and Kenyans alike, that refugees represent a significant 
threat to national security.  Just last week the Kenyan Ministry of State for Immigration and 
Registration of Persons said that the influx of refugees to Kenya is creating a major terrorism threat 
and putting tremendous strain on social services and amenities.  He went on to say that ‘extremist 
groups’ and ‘Islamic radicals’ may use refugee flows to smuggle weapons and people into the 
country to engage in terrorist attacks.  Many people believe the rise in levels of harassment and 
violence toward refugees is because of such public comments and perceptions (Cechvala 2014).”   
                                                          
16 Men, for example, are mostly targeted mostly during the day while women are targeted at night, because 
police officers know that families will pay a premium ransom to have a woman released after dark for fear 
of physical assault or sexual abuse.   
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Kenya: Garissa and the Anti-migrant Elite Rhetoric 
The ascendancy of Somali terror group al-Shabaab- al-Qaeda’s affiliate in East Africa- 
represents Kenya’s most profound security challenge.  Since Kenya joined the African Union’s 
peacekeeping mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2011, Kenya has been increasingly subjected to 
cross-border attacks and seen an expansion of al-Shabaab recruitment efforts among Kenya’s 
marginalized Muslim communities.  Al-Shabaab regularly claims its attacks are reprisals for 
Kenya’s participation in AMISOM.  One such attack, was on Garissa University, situated near 
Dadaab refugee camp near the Kenya-Somali border.  147 Christian students were killed in the 
most deadly terrorist attack since the 2008 bombing of the United States embassy in Nairobi.  It 
was the country’s 135th terrorist attack since 2011.   
The attack greatly undermined an already waning public confidence in the GoK’s ability 
to protect Kenyan nationals and confront the threats of future attacks.  During the fifteen-hour siege, 
it took eleven hours for the Kenyan security forces to arrive in which time most of the hostages 
were killed.  Furthermore, recent warnings of an imminent attack on educational facilities in 
Garissa were all but ignored with only a small group of five security personnel guarding the campus 
prior to the attack.  In the immediate aftermath of the attack, a string of deadly protests in Nairobi- 
led by opposition leader Raila Odinga- called for an overhaul of the country’s electoral commission, 
which they claimed was secretly supporting the ruling coalition led by President Uhuru Kenyatta.     
In April 2015, in addition to the reforms directed at the country’s Muslim population, 
Kenyatta threatened to deport thousands of Somali refugees in a public display of governmental 
authority and assurance.  The threats were followed up with concerted public statements by national 
government officials and local representatives affiliated with Kenyatta’s Jubilee Coalition that 
encouraged citizens to “…blame radicalized refugees for these recurring, heinous attacks” and 
focus their energies on, “uniting under the authority of the Kenyatta in a strong, national response 
to such threat (IOA 2016).  Much of the anti-refugee rhetoric has been focused on native 
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communities in and around Nairobi where electoral opposition to Kenyatta is most evident.  
Television advertisements for Kenyatta replay images of the attacks with the following voice-over: 
Kenya is facing a critical, historic election that will determine our nation’s identity and security 
for decades to come. President Kenyatta is taking action with experience. In a recent nationally 
broadcasted radio interview, the Director of Interior and Coordination of National Government 
(part of Kenyatta’s cabinet) claimed that, “We can no longer sustain this threat of refugees.  We 
have dealt with too much violence and fear from Al-Shabaab, the refugees are all part of that (Paris 
2009).” 
This is not the first time that Kenya has threatened to close Dadaab—in 2011, for example, a 
surge of new arrivals from Somalia, Ethiopia and the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo 
prompted the GoK to issue the “Operation Linda Nchi” (Operation Protect the Country) in response 
to perceived security threats inside the camps.  But the most recent statements have not been 
qualified and the GoK appears to be moving forward with the announced closure and other anti-
refugee policy escalations.  In May 2016, one week before Kenyatta began campaigning for the 
2017 elections, the GoK reaffirmed the camp closure as, “A necessary action for the security and 
wellbeing of every citizen in the country.  The decision to repatriate the refugees is final (IOA 
2016)”.  In the same press conference, the Interior Ministry Principle Secretary announced that the 
DRA- the main national refugee agency- would be disbanded and officially decommissioned with 
the positions left unfilled and international agencies expected to pick up the backlog.  Cooperation 
with the UNHCR on registration and status determinations hangs in a precarious balance as well. 
In response to these announcements, UNHCR released a statement at a press briefing in Geneva 
communicating its apprehension, including that, “…the humanitarian and logistical implications 
would be in breach of Kenya’s international obligations.  In addition to the direct challenges to 
refugee protection with respect to rising levels of harassment and xenophobia, this is seen as an 
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unwise and consequential domestic political maneuver.  The plan to close the world’s largest 
refugee camp is illogical and illegal (RefWorld 2016).”   
Kenya: Existential Threats and the Mobilization of Ethnic Xenophobic Activity 
As illogical and illegal as the closure of Dadaab may be, it scores needed political points 
for a struggling Kenyatta regime.  Kenyatta and his advisors understand that scapegoating refugees 
is an easy way to score political points with voters; it helps that the refugee issue is inextricably 
linked with one of Kenyatta’s other favorite campaign themes: the ongoing war in Somalia.  It is 
no coincidence that in his electoral appeals he calls for the deportation of refugees and the 
construction of an “impenetrable wall on the border with Somalia”.   
Police and security forces appear to be at the fore-front of stoking and permitting public 
hostilities toward migrants, particularly in and around Nairobi.  Recent interviews with members 
of the city police force suggest that police are not sure how to deal with refugees in the city other 
than to threaten arrest or force detention.  One police officer stated, “All we know is that the 
government is shutting down refugee programs and we are supposed to stop and apprehend all 
individuals who may be living in the city illegally (Services) 2016).”  Interviews with local NGO 
staffers confirm that police, “…antagonize the harassment and coordinate anti-refugee activity to 
incite fear for the government in order to secure their positions and to line their pockets (IRIN 
2016).”  Reports from refugees reveal that the police identify members of local communities to 
stalk and intimidate refugees, including the vandalism of refugee-owned shops and the theft of their 
groceries or cell phones (HRW 2015).  There are growing suspicions that major criminal gangs in 
and around Nairobi are recruited by the police to join these efforts, to coordinate xenophobic 
activity throughout the city in order to stir chaos and justify local retaliations against refugees 
(Thurston 2016).   
In a response to a recent question relating to the closure of Dadaab, Kenya’s Deputy 
President William Ruto said, “The way America changed after 9/11 is the way Kenya will change 
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after Garissa.  If Washington can pursue securitization and exclude refugees, Kenya’s logic runs, 
then Kenya should be able to do the same at whatever social costs (Igoye 2016).”   
CASE 2: The Netherlands: The Numbers, Regional Policies, and Local Regime Context 
Since the summer of 2015 the number of refugees entering the European Union (EU) has 
doubled.  According to the latest national figures from the end of 2016, there are 49,400 refugees 
registered in the country (well over three times as many as two years ago).  EU member states, 
including the Netherlands, have agreed to divide 120,000 refugee arrivals to Europe across the 
various member states.  According to the terms of this highly controversial regional deal, the 
Netherlands will receive 7,000 of these 120,000 asylum seekers (in addition to 2,000 asylum 
seekers from Italy and Greece brokered in a prior arrangement).  The Netherlands, in line with 
broader EU policy, aims to contribute to better reception opportunities for refugees in ‘safe 
countries’ within the region of origin, particularly for Syrian migrants in places such as Turkey and 
Jordan.17  The ‘Merkel Plan’, by which it is known, broadly holds that any refugee coming from 
Turkey to Greece after 20 March 2016 will be returned after a short legal procedure (by the end of 
April 2016, 340 people were returned).  The deal with Turkey stipulates that for every refugee that 
Turkey takes back from Greece, the EU will take over one Syrian who now resides in Turkey.  
These people will be divided according to the distribution program mentioned earlier across EU 
member states (in early May 2016, 350 Syrian refugees were redistributed).  In return, Turkish 
nationals will be permitted to travel into the EU without a visa, something the Turkish government 
has long desired.  Moreover, the EU will pay the Turkish government 3 billion euros for its 
reception of refugees (Vos 2016).   
                                                          
17 The primary source of controversy relating to the deal is the designation of Turkey as a ‘safe country’ by 
the EU.  Incidents of forcible return and ill treatment of refugees in Turkey are exceptionally high 
according to reports from Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and several other non-
governmental agencies.   
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The Netherlands domestic asylum procedures are governed by the Ministry of Security and 
Justice in accordance with the Geneva Convention on Refugees and the European Convention on 
Human Rights.  National asylum laws specify a process of application and assessment for asylum 
and resettlement that begins with registration through the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(IND).  After identification and registration, asylum seekers are transferred to a reception center, 
which is usually near the application center that will process the asylum application and follow-up 
with a series of interviews and determination procedures.  The Central Agency for the Reception 
of Asylum Seekers (COA) is responsible for the reception, supervision and departure (from the 
reception center) of asylum seekers; they are also in charge of securing benefits, assisting with 
employment, and providing social housing for those who qualify for refugee status.18   
In contrast to what is often expected of Dutch policy, the Netherlands in particular has one of 
the toughest national refugee policies in Europe.  Refugees are exceedingly less likely to be granted 
residency permits in the Netherlands than in neighboring Germany, Belgium or Sweden.  Based on 
a 2015 report from the Justice Ministry’s Research Department, just under thirty-five percent of 
refugee requests in the Netherlands are honored, compared to a regional average of nearly forty-
eight percent (JMRD 2015).  In addition, the fifteen month rulings period in the country is often 
too long for refugees to wait to receive any assistance or accommodation—many asylum seekers, 
instead, choose to return to their region of origin (mainly to Turkey at this point) even though they 
would likely have been granted a residence permit.19   
For resident refugees, the Dutch government requires working refugees to contribute seventy-
five percent of their income to cover the cost of food and living expenses.20  After a six month 
                                                          
18 This process looks slightly different for unaccompanied minors and children, but does not ensure or 
expedite access to asylum.   
19 The Dutch government is also notoriously slow in processing requests for family reunification which can 
contribute to the lengthy assessment periods and higher-than-average return rates of asylum seekers.   
20 Other European countries have also attracted criticism for plans to confiscate cash and valuables from 
refugees when they enter the country in order to pay for their resettlement expenses.  Denmark’s government, 
for example, wants to seize any amount above 10,000 kroner.  Two German states- Bavaria and Bage-
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period of residence, refugees are allowed to work for up to twenty-four weeks of the year in order 
to manage the impact on local labor markets.  Asylum seekers are also required to declare any 
savings or valuables they bring into the country to the COA (this may include personal possessions 
such as smartphones or wedding rings), which may be used as collateral for required asylum 
payments.   
Settlement Patterns and Local Perspectives 
Historically, asylum seekers have been primarily settled in major towns and cities across 
Holland, including Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Delft and Eindhoven.  This is largely due to patterns 
of reunification for refugee families and close friends from the same countries of origin.  Refugee 
communities tend to be clustered in relatively segregated enclaves in the lower-income parts of 
these cities, often in and around the social housing complexes that accommodate new arrivals.  Prior 
to the Syrian migration crisis affecting EU nations in 2013, the Netherlands was home to 
approximately 200,000 refugees.  The top countries of origin for resident refugees were: 
Afghanistan, Eritrea, Iraq, and Somalia.   
The labor market position of refugees in the Netherlands is, and has been, generally poor.  With 
restrictions to 24 weeks of work a year and barriers to employment such as employee required 
permits for refugees.  Because of the meager earning potential, nearly half of all refugees in the 
country subsist on social assistance programs and often seek employment illegally in a highly 
exploitative alternative jobs market.  These factors in combination have influenced a growing 
negative public perception of refugees, especially in relation to criminal activities and workforce 
participation (Vos 2016).   
 
                                                          
Wurttemburg- plan to claim cash and possessions worth more than €750 and €350 respectively.  Switzerland 
already requires refugees to contribute any amount above 1,000 francs, though they may re-claim the amount 
paid if they leave the country within six months.   
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The Syrian Migration Crisis and “Brexit” 
Between January and October 2015 more than 57,000 people sought asylum in the Netherlands.  
The majority of the arrivals were Syrians (47%), followed by lesser numbers from Eritrea (17%), 
Iraq (6%) and Afghanistan (COA 2015).21  This was a surge in asylum seekers not seen in the 
country since the height of World War II.  And, the direct entry of such unexpectedly large numbers 
of refugees into the country quickly overwhelmed the systems of registration and assessment—
undermining public confidence and drawing intense political scrutiny toward the weaknesses of 
existing reception mechanisms.  EU nations in general were not accustomed to the large-scale, on-
shore arrivals of refugees from such active zones of conflict; nor were their technical procedures 
of reception or registration prepared for a regional event of this magnitude.  The breakdown of EU 
asylum mechanisms exposed cracks in asylum procedures and immigration control throughout the 
region, sharpening the apparent deficit in capacity and resources of countries on the frontier 
borders.  Within weeks, Hungary and Austria announced border closures and enacted strict control 
policies that criminalized any migrants attempting to gain entry into the countries through 
spontaneous arrival from Syria, Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon or Greece.   
Anxieties in Great Britain also boiled over in a major display of discontent, as the ‘migration 
crisis’ ushered the country’s leading critics of the EU into the mainstream.  For the once fringe 
proponents of a British exit from the EU, the arrival of Syrian migrants stood as a panacea for all 
that was wrong with the regional union.  And a majority of those who turned out to vote on the EU 
referendum agreed. Over the course of the Brexit campaign, immigration became a primary focal 
point for politicians and voters throughout Europe—polling revealed that immigration quickly rose 
to the top issue of concern for residents of 12 European nations during months leading up to the 
vote in Great Britain.  Amid the Brexit frenzy, the media portrayed the arrival of migrants as an 
                                                          
21 According to the figures from the Dutch COA, by far the largest group (about 18,000) is 18 to 29 years 
old.  Next are the groups aged 30 to 39 years (nearly 10,000 asylum seekers) and 12 to 17 years (5,031).  
There are about 10,000 minors in the refugee reception centers.  Fifteen to twenty percent of the residents are 
children of school age.   
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inundation, blasting images made public by far right leader Nigel Farage of a poster with refugees 
crossing the Croatia-Slovenia border with the words “BREAKING POINT” written over the 
picture.  In smaller script, the line above read, “We must break free of the EU and take back control 
of our borders (Hall 2016).”    Although Europe has experienced but a fraction of Syrian refugees 
in comparison to neighboring host states (approximately 1 million Syrian refugees have requested 
asylum in Europe, compared to the 4.8 million refugees residing in Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey), 
the drama of such an historic event provided ample opportunities for elites throughout the region 
to exploit anxieties and play to the extremes, including calls for a ‘Nexit’ among far right party 
leaders in the Netherlands.   
Prior to the enforcement of the Merkel Plan, Syrian refugees arrived to the Netherlands by three 
main routes: the Western Balkan route, the Eastern Mediterranean route, and the Central 
Mediterranean route.  Entry primarily occurred through sea ports in either Greece or Italy via long, 
dangerous journeys across Turkey and the Aegean or Mediterranean Sea.  For those continuing on 
to the Netherlands, refugees then traveled north- often by foot- along the railway lines, through 
Macedonia and Serbia, into Hungary (or Slovenia) and Croatia, and towards Germany before 
crossing the southern border of the Netherlands to claim asylum.22   
Since the Merkel Plan, the on-shore arrivals from Greece to the Netherlands have all but 
stopped.  Syrian refugees are, instead, airlifted directly from Turkey to one of several reception 
sites for processing and resettlement by the COA.  The reception sites include thirty-two large and 
medium-sized cities across the country, including Rotterdam, Maastricht, and Zeist.  Municipal 
authorities in these areas enter a voluntary contract with the COA, with quotas set for a 6-month 
period.  As part of the contract, municipalities agree to house a certain number of refugees and to 
                                                          
22 It did not matter that these images were later discovered to be ‘fake’ pictures of people crossing a border 
in the Middle East.   
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coordinate with local agencies (often the Dutch Refuge Council) to provide integration services 
and support (ERN 2015).   
In addition to the broader regional and national controversies surrounding the distribution plan 
for refugees in the EU, the COA municipal contracts have become a major source of tension among 
locals within receiving towns and cities.  The main points of contention are municipal financial 
support and social housing availability.  Municipal authorities have complained to the Danish 
government that there is not enough money available to provide the services required.  Nor is there 
enough housing.  Before the current arrivals from Syria began, there was a significant social 
housing shortage across the country.  Housing associations, which used to own most of these 
houses, have in recent years sold much of their social housing stock, and the increase in the number 
of asylum seekers has only exacerbated the problem.  Municipalities in the north ran out of social 
housing options for refugees and have, instead, repurposed unused prison facilities to accommodate 
arriving refugees; which has drawn its fair share of criticism.  But the shortages of social housing 
for refugees and other Dutch residents remains a major source of concern and a favorite point of 
reference for illiberal elites in their anti-migrant appeals.   
Symbolic Elite Rhetoric and Anti-Migrant Mobilizations 
Political elites from the country’s growing far right movements have capitalized upon local 
unease and uncertainty relating to the number and scale of migrant arrivals as well as the 
momentum from the departure of Great Britain from the EU.  Recent mass casualty events 
throughout Europe, the most recent being an attack on a Christmas market in Berlin, also feature 
centrally in anti-refugee antagonisms.  The infamous leader of the Dutch Freedom Party (PVV), 
Geert Wilders, has made xenophobic rhetoric routine in public statements that are broadcast 
nationwide, saying that “refugees need to be locked up in asylum centers” and that Dutch women 
need to be protected from “testosterone bombs” waging “sexual jihad” (Cluskey 2015).  He has 
blamed refugees for rising sexual assault rates throughout the region, and makes frequent calls for 
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the Netherlands to close its borders to “all asylum seekers”.23  At PVV party rallies, supporters pass 
out fake pepper spray or ‘resistance spray’ with images of fleeing migrants printed on the sides of 
the small containers.  In general, political parties are the main vessel through which illiberal elites 
exercise their muscle for anti-migrant mobilization.  This is increasingly the case for a proliferating 
base of far right parties that seem to be splintering along lines of anti-migrant extremism.  Self-
appointed ‘anti-crime’ groups who are known to be expressly anti-migrant have also ballooned, 
from 124 groups in 212 to 661 in 2016.  Many of these groups promote “organized vigilance against 
outsiders and the large number of foreigners in our communities (NYT 2016).”   
Tensions have come to a head in many municipalities, including recent wildcat protests in Oude 
Pekela (a mid-size city near the German border) whose citizens expressed rising fear over the 
number of arriving refugees and the lack of space to accommodate them in the town.  The protests 
have become violent in places like Enschede, another mid-size industrial city in the eastern part of 
the country; where local PVV party activists and anti-crime group members attacked refugee 
reception centers with firebombs and teargas.  Refugees in the Brabant village of Heesch have 
likewise been targeted amid plans for the construction of a new reception center in the town’s center 
(Vos 2016).   
Much of the anti-migrant activism revolves around town halls and local municipal offices. 
Anti-migrant groups have hurled bottles and fireworks outside council meetings, sent bullets in the 
mail to officials, and dumped severed pigs’ heads at sites of proposed refugee centers.   Politicians 
competing for national power have seized on local tensions, driving a wedge between local 
municipal authorities and their constituents in order to consolidate more centralized support a the 
national level.  Several legislative leaders of the PVV, including Jack van der Dussen, have publicly 
fueled the controversies over municipal resettlement contracts and housing shortages; saying that, 
                                                          
23 In December 2016, Wilders was found guilty of inciting discrimination against migrants by a panel of 3 
judges in a national court.   
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“Municipal authorities do not have the best interest of their communities in mind.  Instead, they 
violate residents’ trust by contracting with the COA to overrun the services and residences of the 
town with refugees.  The end goal should be stronger national policies to reduce migrant arrivals 
altogether which would bring an end to the municipal contract program (NLTimes 2016).”   
 
 
Table 6.1: Cross-Case Comparison, Kenya and the Netherlands 
KENYA THE NETHERLANDS 
 
Refuges Numbers: 638,000 (registered) 
Refugee Regime: GoK-UNHCR  
 
Refugee Numbers: 49,900 (registered) 
Refugee Regime: GoN, COA (and municipal officers) 
 
 
Structural Dimension of Threat:   
Garissa University attacks 
Foreign policy toward Al-Shabaab 
Past history of resettlement 
 
Structural Dimension of Threat: 
Syrian migration crisis/Brexit 
 
 
Anti-Migrant Elite Rhetoric: 
1. Kenyatta makes Al-Shabaab connection with 
refugees in camps.  Pledges to shut down 
camps and crack-down on refugee presence in 
cities.   
2. Opposition uses refugee threat and attacks to 
question the competency of the Kenyatta 
regime. 
 
 
Anti-Migrant Elite Rhetoric: 
1. Geert Wilders and PVV portray Syrian 
migration as ‘inundation’ of Europe. 
2. Focus antagonisms against refugees at the 
municipal level to incite opposition against 
federal government decisions. 
3. Exploits momentum from Brexit to advocate 
similar departure. 
Mechanisms of Mobilization: 
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Mechanisms of Mobilization: 
Using the police and security forces. 
Using the PVV party system and supporters. 
 
Examples of Ethnic Xenophobic Activity: 
Coordinated police harassment 
Stalking, theft and vandalism of refugee property 
Stabbings and physical violence 
 
Examples of Ethnic Xenophobic Activity: 
Imagery and language suggesting violence 
Protests and rallies at municipal offices 
Physical violence (including gun violence) 
Vandalism of refugee homes and shops 
 
 
6.3 Lebanon and the United States 
CASE 1: Lebanon: Regime Context and Resettlement Practices 
Lebanon has a long and storied history of hosting refugees in the region.  During the 1948 
Arab-Israeli War 100,000 Palestinians fled to the country.  Today, 450,000 of these refugees and 
their descendants remain in 12 camps; a clear indication that Lebanon- unlike neighboring Jordan- 
has not pursued meaningful policies of integration due to fears that such inclusion would upset its 
delicate sectarian balance of Sunnis, Shiites, and Christians.  The arrival of 1.5 million mostly 
Sunni Syrian refugees has reiterated this history of isolation and exclusion as a way to contain the 
externalities of such a large-scale immigration event, especially as Syrian migrants have risen to 
over a quarter of the population in Lebanon.   
 
 
71 
 
 
Map of Refugee Settlements in Lebanon: UNHCR 2014 
As these practices may suggest, Lebanon is not party to the 1951 Convention Pertaining to 
the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol, both of which are the central fixtures of the international 
refugee regime guiding the designation and treatment of those seeking protection from persecution 
or life-threatening circumstances in their countries of origin.  The country also lacks any domestic 
legislation specifically addressing the status of refugees.  Refugee status is, at present, determined 
mainly by the provisions of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between Lebanon 
and the UNHCR in September 2003.  The MOU provides a mechanism for the “issuing of 
temporary residence permits to asylum seekers (LOC 2015).”  Under the terms of the MOU, the 
UNHCR adjudicates claims for asylum and the government issues a $200 (USD) temporary 
residence permit, normally for three months but possibly extended for six to nine months with 
additional fees as high as $2,000 (USD).    The existing legal instruments pertaining to refugee 
status and treatment have been widely criticized by the international community, as well as other 
independent stakeholders of protection, as inadequate and insufficient.  In 2010, for instance, the 
UNHCR reported that, “Refugees enjoy few, if any, legal rights in Lebanon. (UNHCRd 2014).” 
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The only piece of domestic legislation that relates to refugees is the Law Regulating the Entry and 
Stay of Foreigners in Lebanon and their Exit from the Country which was enacted in 1962 which 
stipulates provisions for providing sanctuary to refugees as well as their subjugation to deportation 
for any ‘illegal’ activities.24   
  Other instructions applicable to the entry of Syrians into Lebanon have been published by 
the General Directorate of General Security (GDGS).  These assign lengths of stay and require 
different supporting documentation depending on the purpose of stay (tourism, attending school, 
receiving medical treatment, etc).  These instructions stipulate that, “no Syrian shall be permitted 
to enter as a refugee save in exceptional circumstances as shall be later determined in coordination 
with the Ministry of Social Affairs.”  They further state that, “Syrians previously registered as 
refugees will be allowed to reenter if they meet the conditions set out in this memorandum”, and 
that, “a notarized commitment not to seek employment shall be provided when renewing temporary 
residency permits…by Syrian refugees holding UNHCR certificates (Saliba 2015, General-
Security 2016).”   
In addition to the $200 residency permit refugees are required to purchase (which often 
includes additional unofficial ‘administrative’ fees), refugees in Lebanon are- as stated by the 
GDGS instructions- not permitted to pursue employment or participate in any paid work in the 
country.  This stipulation has forced refugees into the black market economy, working illegally in 
arrangements that compound their vulnerabilities and offer wages at forty-percent less than the 
                                                          
24 The relevant provisions of this law include articles 26, 31, and 32: Article 26 stipulates that: “Any 
foreigners who is subject of pursuit or has been convicted for a political crime by a Non-Lebanese authority 
or whose life or freedom is threatened because of political considerations may ask for political asylum.” 
Article 31 stipulates that: “If a decision to expel a political refugee has been made it is not permissible to 
deport such refugee to the territory of a state where his life or freedom are not secured.” 
Pursuant to article 32, “foreigners who enter Lebanon illegally can be imprisoned for one month to 3 years 
and/or fined” (GoL 1962 Law, 2016).    
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$448 per month Lebanese minimum wage rate (ILO 2015).  Unemployment among refugees is 
staggering, doubling to nearly forty-five percent since 2012.   
Some eighty-six percent of Lebanon’s refugees live in poor villages, with no access to work 
or education; there are no formal camps for non-Palestinian refugees in the country.  Nearly half of 
resident refugees reportedly live in unfinished buildings, empty stores, parking lots, and on the 
periphery of agricultural fields—including in predominately Shiite areas like the Bekaa Valley.  
Refugees, without systematic support or access to parallel benefits, compete directly with poor 
members of local communities for access to available resources, including housing and informal 
sector employment.  In the Northern territories (including El-Koura, Bcharreh, Zgharta, and 
Minieh-Dannieh districts), near one of the two main border crossings with Syria, towns and villages 
have been intensely affected by large-scale refugee arrivals; particularly in terms of competition in 
the traditional labor markets and the wider economic implications of sectarianism and social 
polarization since the fall of Homs at the hands of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).  The 
influx of Syrian refugees has exacerbated inequalities in host communities to the benefit of land 
and business owners, while negatively affecting workers.  Business and capital owners have taken 
advantage of Syrian refugees who provide them with cheap labor and rent their properties.  
Lebanese workers have lost their jobs to Syrians and suffer from rising commodity prices and rents 
(Oxfam 2016).   
Many municipalities have implemented curfews for refugees in response to local fears and 
anxieties.  But the absence of effective law enforcement makes these curfews nearly unenforceable, 
except by vigilante groups within local host communities.  Still, municipalities consider law 
enforcement as a fundamental means to sustain social cohesion, especially to maintain restrictions 
on refugee’s livelihood activities or engagement in civil society.  The pressure on municipalities is 
tremendous—garbage collection, infrastructure repair and security needs have doubled, while their 
respective revenues have declined.  Since there are no taxes placed on Syrian refugees (without 
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access to employment and thereby diminished spending power), there is no sustainable mechanism 
in place to maintain such public goods and services.  A major cause of the problem is that the 
central government has transferred the responsibility of handling the arrival and settlement of 
refugees to local authorities without providing the appropriate financial or administrative means 
with which to do so (Oxfam 2016).   
Making matters worse, there is nearly no coordination among humanitarian actors in the 
country who have overwhelmed municipal leaders with bureaucratic demands and processes.  Aid 
delivery is splintered across several donor organizations with their own procedures and priorities.  
In response to criticism over the systems of aid and relief in the country, an Oxfam staffer 
responded, “Municipal leaders do not understand the complexities and overlapping nature of aid 
relationships.  What is more, the fragmentation of assistance is ineffective on a systemic level, and 
municipalities want more durable and long-term development projects (ReliefWeb 2016).”   
Unsurprisingly, local opposition toward refugee arrivals and settlement is on the rise, 
especially as more of the burden falls on host communities for the coordination of scarce resources 
and assistance without much- if any- support from the central government.  Polling in three of 
Lebanon’s largest metropolitan districts the year before the 2014 revealed that 90% of local 
Lebanese support discriminatory policies toward refugees, 75% want to prohibit refugee 
employment and political freedoms, and over 10% “highly endorse” violence directed toward 
Syrian refugees (Harb and Saab 2014).25  There are widespread anti-refugee social media 
campaigns organized at the municipal level calling for action against refugees—including video 
posts that show violence being carried out against refugee men, women, and children.   
Lebanon: Ethnic Xenophobic Activity, Structural Dimensions of Threat, and the 2014 Elections 
                                                          
25 This study was conducted by Dr. Charles Harb and Reem Saab of the American University of Beirut and 
summarised in an Al Akhbar English article.  The surveyed areas were Akkar, the Bekaa Valley, and Wadi 
Khaled.  See more at: http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/syrian-refugees-lebanons-latest-scapegoat-
1532320963#sthash.ZfZAPS2Q.dpuf 
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The 2014 elections worked as a pivotal, symbolic event for the exercise of frustrations and 
anxieties toward refugees (and the central government) among much of the electorate.  Not only because 
the central government had postponed the general election for months-on-end due to a parliamentary 
deadlock, but because the opposition- led by Michel Aon and his Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) (allied 
with Hezbollah which supports Assad’s regime in Syria) - campaigned vigorously across the country 
on an anti-migrant platform which portrayed the central government as incompetent, and its ‘liberal 
treatment’ of refugees as the main source of rising crime rates, extremist recruitment, unemployment, 
and inequality (ReliefWeb 2016).  The FPM mobilized municipal authorities as party agents throughout 
the 17-month extended period in the run-up to elections, providing scripts of heavily anti-refugee 
broadcast materials and instructions on how to, “…suppress the refugee threat with help from the local 
opposition (Alabaster 2016)” Local municipalities, including those in Ehden, erected party signs at their 
local offices telling all Syrian workers and all unregistered foreigners in Lebanon to, “Leave by October 
31”.  Aon was the originator of the ‘curfew dialogue’ and encouraged all municipalities as a symbol of 
support in the election to enact a 6pm curfew for all resident refugees (or individuals perceived as such) 
(Chehayeb 2016).   
Aon and the FPM are reviving old animosities that stem from historical relationships between 
Lebanon and Syrian workers—dating back to well before the outbreak of the civil war in 2011, and the 
influx of Syrian refugees into Lebanon.  Specific appeals reference the nearly thirty-year occupation of 
Lebanon by Syrian forces as a basis for discrimination and exclusion.  Nationalistic narratives of 
Lebanon’s ‘superior intelligence and statehood’ (as descendants of the Phoenician people) in the region 
are also common rhetoric for the FPM elite and their followers.  This is especially the case with respect 
to Syrian workers and what is seen as a social hierarchy between Lebanese and Syrians.  Assaf Dahdah, 
a visiting professor of human geography at Lebanese American University, commented that, “To the 
people of Lebanon, Syrians are just workers who are valuable only to the extent that they contribute to 
the economic advancement of Lebanon.  They have been useful to the development of the country, but 
the Lebanese don’t want them to stay. Locals are accustomed to short-term circular patterns of labor 
migration with the Syrians which complimented the seasonal movement of many middle-class Lebanese 
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from their winter and summer homes.  This indefinite settlement in the country is causing much anxiety 
among locals, which is being twisted by the FPM for sure (Dahdah 2016).”     
FPM spokesman and Minister of Education, Elias Bou Saab, has made repeated remarks 
relating to the threats of refugees for the people of Lebanon, in relation to a second occupation and a 
loss of control over daily life in Lebanon, including, “The Lebanese people must take a stand against 
Sunni extremism and an occupational surge from Syria.  These are dangerous times for our country and 
the insecurities increase with each Syrian crossing the border.  History mandates a defense (Chehayeb 
2016).” The tone has, likewise, become retaliatory among supporters, with reports of escalating actions 
against refugees that are becoming increasingly violent.  Municipal vigilante groups are suspected of 
coordinating a nation-wide burning of refugee reception centers from Beirut to Tripoli, affecting nearly 
10 towns and villages in between.  Atomistic attacks against refugee men include reports of stalking 
and intimidation on the streets followed by several incidents of forced entry and physical assaults at 
night in often insecure refugee dwellings.  Ali, a refugee from Syria, describes one such attack against 
him in his home in Jnah when he was, “…shot with a pump-action shotgun by a group of men from a 
Lebanese political party (HRW 2014).”     
Clashes in Arsal between Lebanese forces and extremist groups in August 2014 fueled the 
rising activisms, including anti-refugee protests that turned violent in several locations.  Human Rights 
Report documented eleven attacks over a three week period after the encounter in Arsal.  Several of the 
attacks involved community groups coordinating through FPM municipal offices to forcible expel 
refugees from their town.  The primary areas affected included Beirut, Mount Lebanon, and Northern 
governorates.  In response, Deputy Director of Human Rights Watch in the Middle East and North 
Africa, Nadim Houry, appealed, “Lebanon’s security forces should protect everyone on Lebanese soil, 
not turn a blind eye to vigilante political groups who are terrorizing refugees (Houry 2016).”  The 
Lebanese Institute for Democracy and Human Rights (LIFE), a local non-governmental organization, 
said it had documented two dozen violent attacks against Syrians in the same period.  Several of the 
attacks involved locals with knives or guns pulling refugees out of buses or vans.  The majority of these 
 
 
77 
 
attacks were reported in the Bekaa, the Nabaa, and the Bourj Hammond neighborhoods of Beirut and 
Beirut’s southern suburbs (LIFE 2015).  The local media reported on similar incidents in Douris, al-
Lailaki and Hay al-Sellom—including the tying up of two men by locals who left them as human 
roadblocks facing traffic.  The same day, assailants fired on an unofficial refugee settlement in Hermel, 
wounding two Syrians (LIFE 2015).  No follow-up actions were taken to apprehend or question those 
responsible for the attacks, according to local agencies.  One of the refugee victims explained his ordeal 
to the police and recorded the following response, “Don’t get so upset about such things.  There is really 
nothing we can do any way (HRW 2014).”  In the aftermath of these reports Aon released a statement 
on the honorable position of police and security forces on the ‘front lines in our communities’ and 
promised to raise the wages of security and police officers, including more resources and relief for their 
work (LIFE 2015).  Refugees in areas throughout Beirut began reporting the posting of flyers by local 
residents demanding that Syrians leave their neighborhoods by a certain date.  There were also mass 
SMS messages sent out via an unknown number to large populations of Syrian refugees throughout the 
city with a message to “Leave immediately or you will be slaughtered or tortured to death (Oxfam 
2016).”  The stabbing of a Syrian refugee man in Rawda set off a series of copy-cat attacks in several 
districts, justified as punishment for refugees being out after curfew hours.   
Few politicians have stepped up to condemn the violence and harassment.  There have been 
recent statements from Walid Jumblatt of the Progressive Socialist Party and Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah 
from Hezbollah calling for an end to the brutalities.  A group of FPM loyalists in municipal leadership 
positions, including Antoine Chakhoutra from Dekwaneh (a suburb of northern Beirut), responded with 
a full page advertisement in the local newspaper that showed images of people (supposed to be Syrian 
refugees) wielding guns with the text, “Every gathering by Syrians is a sleeper cell directed against the 
security, economic, livelihood, or environmental sectors of our nation (LIFE 2015).”   
The election of Michel Aon and the FPM to the presidency in August of 2016 has left the fate 
of Syrian refugees in Lebanon in question.  The calls for expulsion and concerted attacks continue.  Aon 
made it a promise to end the arrival of Syrians and force their return to their country of origin so that 
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they may pledge allegiance to Assad.  In his inaugural address, Aon stated, “There will be no solution 
in Syria without the immediate return of the Syrian refugees to their country.  The issue of Syrian 
refugees will be resolved as soon as possible (Alabaster 2016).”   
CASE 2: The United States: the History of Resettlement and Third Country Protection 
The United States is by far the largest of the 10 “traditional” resettlement countries, in that 
it has historically accepted more refugees for resettlement than all other member states of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) combined.26  The US began 
formally resettling refugees in the aftermath of World War II, admitting over 250,000 displaced 
Europeans.  The first piece of refugee legislation was passed soon thereafter in 1948, called The 
Displaced Persons Act.  The legislation provided for the admission of an additional 400,000 
displaced Europeans.  It established a precedent of resettlement that is based on country of origin 
and the urgency of individual situations.  The Cold War ushered in an era of heightened political 
resettlement for refugees who ‘voted with their feet’ by fleeing communist regimes in the Soviet 
Union, Southeast Asia and Cuba.  The US loosened resettlement criteria to also accept refugees 
from other communist nations including Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, Korea and China.  The 
                                                          
26 The US also grants political asylum to more than 20,000 persons each year, extends temporary protected 
status (TPS) to tens of thousands of foreign nationals who would face refugee-like conditions at home, and 
offers protection to survivors of human trafficking.   
The main difference between refugees and asylum seekers in the US is their location.  Refugee 
determinations take place outside the US and asylum claims are considered within the country, but the 
same standard governs both determinations.  Under US law, political asylum can be granted at the 
discretion of the US Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security to migrants who have a 
“well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group, or political opinion (INAa 2016).” 
The legal definition of “refugee” excludes many categories of persons at risk of persecution and violence, 
and does not correspond to the more expansive public understanding of the term.  Under US law, a refugee 
must live outside his or her country of nationality or, in special circumstances, within his or her country of 
origin.  In addition, a refugee must be at risk on account of an enumerated ground and cannot have persecuted 
others.  Among other requirements, a political asylum seeker must establish that he or she meets the refugee 
definition (ether based on past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution), did not firmly 
resettle in a third country, could not have avoided persecution by relocating within his/her country, did not 
persecute other or commit certain crimes, and is not a security risk (INAb 2016).   
Under the UN Convention Against Torture (ratified by the US in 1994), withholding can also be granted to 
a person who established that it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured in the proposed 
country of removal (CFR 2016).   
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primary sources of assistance for refugees at the time were private ethnic and religious 
organizations, which formed the basis of the public/private arrangement that characterizes the 
present-day resettlement program.   
In 1975, the US resettled hundreds of thousands of Southeast Asian refugees through an ad 
hoc Refugee Task Force with temporary funding and limited mandate.  This encouraged Congress 
to pass the Refugee Act of 1980, which incorporated the United Nations definition of “refugee” 
and standardized the resettlement services for all refugees admitted to the US.  The Refugee Act 
provides the legal basis for today’s US Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP).  And set the stage 
for an expansion of funding to include victims of persecution and violence in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Burma, and Sudan (including Darfuris) in the 1980s and 90s. The US has 
mostly continued to expand its list of approved countries of resettlement to include Iraq, Syria, 
Afghanistan, and Bhutan to name a few.  Since the beginning of the USRAP, the US has resettled 
over 3 million refugees, with annual admissions figures ranging from a high of 207,000 in 1980 to 
a low of 27,110 in 2002 (Bruno 2016, RCUSA 2016).   
Each year, the President of the United States, after consulting with Congress and other 
federal agencies, determines the designated nationalities and processing priorities for refugee 
resettlement for the upcoming year.  The President also has the authority to set annual ceilings on 
the total number of refugees who may enter the US from each region of the world.  This gives the 
executive branch tremendous authority in controlling and shaping the number of arrivals as well as 
their respective countries of origin.   
There are currently nine refugee resettlement agencies (known as Volunteer Agencies, or 
‘VOLAGs’ for short), with over three-hundred local sites and affiliates that provide resettlement 
and integration support to new arrivals.  These organizations include: Church World Service, 
Ethiopian Community Development Council, Episcopal Migration Ministries, HIAS, The 
International Rescue Committee, Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service, US Committee for 
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Refugees and Immigrants, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops/Migration and Refugee 
Services, and World Relief.  They all have cooperative agreements with the Department of State to 
serve as contracts for the resettlement of refugees.  In addition to these domestic actors, there are 
five international NGOs that operate Resettlement Support Centers around the world under the 
supervision and funding of the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) and the US 
Department of State, and thousands of private citizens who also contribute to these efforts.27  Other 
major administrative agencies include the US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) under 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS); and the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) under 
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).28   
Four US states resettled more than 40 percent of refugees since 2010: California (nearly 16 
percent); Washington (just under 10 percent); New York (just under 9 percent); and Florida (7 
percent).  The resettlement patterns of refugees within the states of the US are generally dominated 
by ethnic communities; meaning that US resettlement agencies try as much as possible to place 
refugees in areas in which the refugee may already have family members or where there are pre-
existing ethnic communities (in order to coordinate services around shared languages and cultural 
practices).  To date, Florida- perhaps unsurprisingly- has resettled more Cubans than all other states 
combined.  New York has resettled the largest number of refugees from former Soviet states, Sierra 
Leone, and Liberia; whereas California has resettled large numbers of Vietnamese and Iranians.  
The largest number of arrivals from Iraq was resettled in Michigan and many Somali and Ethiopian 
                                                          
27 PRM also contracts with overseas processing entities (OPEs) to screen persons referred to the program, 
and to prepare their cases for consideration by USCIS.  OPEs collect important biographic information as 
well as personal information to assist resettlement agencies in placement decisions, including information on 
medical conditions, languages spoken, and job history.  OPEs enter this data into DOS’s Worldwide Refugee 
Admissions Processing System (WRAPS).   
28 The International Organization of Migration (IOM) also arranges in coordination with PRM refugee travel 
to the US through a loan program.  PRM also funds nonprofit refugee resettlement agencies to provide 
‘reception and placement’ services for refugees for their first 30 to 90 days in the US.  ORR coordinates the 
provision of benefits and services to refugees in the US.   
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refugees were resettled in Minnesota.  The largest number of Sudanese refugees arrived in Texas 
(Patrick 2004).   
The UNHCR also partners with the US refugee resettlement program to identify those in 
most urgent need of resettlement around the world.  The process is referred to as “Third Country 
Resettlement” which is one of the three “durable (or permanent) solutions” promoted by the 
UNHCR.  Most often, refugees identified for resettlement to the US by the UNHCR are at risk for 
forced repatriation, face threats in the country of first asylum (or first arrival) similar to those that 
forced them to leave their homes in the first place, and/or those with particular disabilities or health 
concerns.29 
Despite being the top third country of resettlement, the US retains a large resettlement 
shortfall that has accumulated to more than 500,000 between 1991 and 2013.  It is true that refugee 
ceilings are rarely reached—and the remaining slots cannot be carried over to the next fiscal year.  
Thus, the actual number of refugees admitted for resettlement has also dropped dramatically over 
the last decade.30   
9/11 and Refugee Program Reforms 
The declining trend in resettlement rates began, most notably, in the aftermath of the 
September 11 attacks on the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City.  In the same 
way that dramatic expansions of the resettlement program occurred within the context of the Cold 
War as an important political action against communism, 9/11 inspired a significant reaction 
                                                          
29 The UNHCR communicates recommendations for US resettlement to the DOS via a process of priority 
referrals, primarily what is called the “P-1” (meaning priority 1) referral or P-1 group referral.  There are also 
P-2 and P-3 referrals for cases involving persons of special humanitarian concern to the US (e.g. Iranian 
religious minorities) and cases of family reunification.   
30 Reasons for the decline include the decreased demand for US resettlement from communist countries, and 
a new era of interviewing much smaller clusters of refugee candidates from some 80 different countries.  
Therefore the numbers of refugees declined into smaller clusters, from a greater number of non-Soviet or 
communist countries, where access to refugees for determination and referral is nearly impossible because 
of on-going or active conflict.  This occurred simultaneously with new security procedures that revealed 
substantially higher levels of fraudulent refugee claims from new and emerging populations of concern (DOS 
2002).   
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against migrants from predominately Muslim countries that drove resettlement numbers to an 
historic low.  The resettlement program was frozen for 2 months with an emergency moratorium 
in order to conduct a comprehensive review of procedures, including those involving security.  A 
number of new security measures were adopted as a result and incorporated into the resettlement 
process, including conducting enhanced security checks of applicants against an additional 10 
international databases and using biometrics to track and verify the identities of all refugee travelers 
before boarding flights to the US.31  Post 9/11 legislation- including the USA Patriot Act of 2001 
and the REAL ID Act of 2005- significantly expanded the grounds of inadmissibility based on 
“terrorist activity.”32  The enhanced security checks affected the admission of thousands of would-
be refugees to the US, especially in the Middle East where many individuals already approved by 
DHS were subsequently denied entry.33  In a recorded response to the media, David Burnham- the 
co-director of Syracuse University’s Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) - 
commented that, “After 9/11 the Bush administration tried to see immigration enforcement- 
particularly for refugees- as a way to fight terrorism.  And it’s just not (Newland 2015).” 
                                                          
31 These background checks are conducted by the USCIS in coordination with the FBI, the CIA, and DOS 
conduct.  Certain refugees receive Security Advisory Opinion (SAO) reviews based on classified criteria.  
SAO screening also covers persons in unclassified categories that have been established by DOS’s Bureau 
of Consular Affairs based on US foreign policy interests and security concerns.  A major problem with SAO 
review is that it can cause significant delay in processing refugees—it can take months to receive responses 
from the relevant agencies in particular cases.   
32 As it stands, the terrorism-related grounds of inadmissibility have led to the exclusion of thousands of 
refugees, and the delays and denials in the cases of hundreds of asylum seekers who opposed repressive 
governments or who supported terrorist groups under duress.  
33 A one-year filing deadline for asylum applications and grants was also implemented, along with a 
heightened burden of proof for asylum claims, new corroboration requirements, and a more exclusive 
definition of social group membership (Kerwin/MPI 2011).  The “expedited removal” process established in 
1996, has also expanded since 9/11 to concern noncitizens (with insufficient or no documents) who arrive at 
US ports of entry, cross US land borders, or enter by sea which also affected the claims of thousands of 
asylum seekers.   
The US also has limited legal tools to admit and offer temporary protection to persons who do not meet the 
strict refugee standard.  It can “parole” noncitizens into the nation, but only on a case-by-case basis for urgent 
humanitarian reasons or to provide a significant public benefit.  IT can extend temporary protected status to 
residents of a foreign state in which there is an armed conflict, natural disaster, or other extraordinary 
conditions that temporarily prevent them from returning.  It can also exercise its discretion not to remove 
noncitizens in certain cases.  Finally, it can provide temporary visas- leading to lawful permanent resident 
status in some cases- to certain survivors of severe human trafficking.   
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Despite their symbolic value, the moratorium and enhancement of security screenings did 
little to assuage the intense political backlash and public scrutiny.  The scenario was unfamiliar to 
say the least; since its inception, the US refugee program- and in particular those involved in 
admission and resettlement work- had never been thrust into the limelight of national controversy 
in such a dramatic way.  Nearly every top-level federal employee involved in the program was 
called to testify before congress, despite any evidence that refugees formally resettled in the US 
were involved in planning or carrying-out the 9/11 attacks (DOS 2003).   
In response, the DOS, in coordination with DHS and UNHCR field affiliates, shifted their 
focus away from the resettlement of refugees from the Middle East toward displaced populations 
elsewhere, including the Somali Bantu, Columbian refugees in Ecuador and Costa Rica, and the 
“Meshketian Turks” in southern Russia (Dewey 2003).  The acts of exclusion by USRAP- and 
coordinating agencies- did not, however, designate enhanced protection mechanisms or special 
provisions for refugee groups (particularly those perceived to be of Middle Eastern origin) already 
resettled in the US.  The vulnerabilities of these populations to rising hostilities among citizens 
across the country was immediately evident.  The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) released 
figures of hate crimes against immigrants in the months following 9/11 which showed a 1,700 
percent increase in the number of discriminatory acts (mostly violent) committed against 
immigrants, including refugees (FBI 2001).   
US Invasion of Iraq, the Islamic State, and the Economy: the Rise of ‘Blue Collar’ 
Authoritarianism   
The United States’ decision to invade Iraq on 20 March 2003 was a deeply partisan issue 
that polarized large portions of the electorate and drew widespread condemnation from the 
international community, including the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).   Justifications 
for the invasion centered upon the “imminent threat” of then-President Saddam Hussein’s weapons 
of mass destruction and ties to terrorism, including attacks in the US.  Republicans in congress 
overwhelmingly supported the Bush administration with the passage of the Iraq Resolution 
 
 
84 
 
(formally the Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution of 2002), which 
authorized military action against Iraq.  The invasion of Iraq was a continuation of the paradigm of 
US foreign policy outlined the previous year in the National Security Strategy of the United States 
(published on 17 September 2002), also referred to as the Bush Doctrine (Krauthammer 2008) .  
This doctrine set forth a collection of strategy principles rooted in neoconservative ideology and 
reflected a unilateralist approach of intervention, including pre-emptive strikes and democratic 
regime change.  In his 2003 State of the Union Address, President Bush declared, “Americans are 
free people, who know that freedom is the right of every person and the future of every nation.  The 
liberty we prize is not America’s gift to the world, it is God’s gift to humanity (Knickmeyer 2006).”  
In a previous speech to the cadets at the US Military Academy at West Point, in June 2002, Bush 
spoke directly to the perceived threats of the nation saying, “If we wait for the threats to fully 
materialize, we will have waited too long—our security will require transforming the military you 
will lead—a military that must be ready to strike at a moment’s notice in any dark corner of the 
world.  And our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready 
for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives (Krauthammer 
2008).”   
After nearly nine years of the war in Iraq, in which tens of thousands of Iraqis died and 
nearly 4,500 US service-members were killed, it was apparent that there would be no clear victory 
for the US.  The US declared an end to the Iraq War on 15 December 2011 and withdrew the last 
convoy of American troops three days later.  But not without serious consequences for the 
deepening of sectarian divisions and the growth of extremism throughout the war-ravaged country. 
The perceived failure of the Bush administration’s foreign policy approach in the Middle East 
(including the exorbitant costs- in terms of the economy and human lives- associated with the 
invasion and occupation), turned large portions of the US public against the President and 
 
 
85 
 
Republican members of congress.34  The end of the war in Iraq did nothing, however, to quell the 
anxieties of Americans toward terrorism and its implications for daily life in towns and cities across 
the country.  If anything, anxieties rose as a new terrorist threat, called the Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syrian (ISIS), capitalized upon the chaos in Iraq left behind by the invasion, focusing coordinated 
energies of destruction toward the west with highly publicized calls for violence and disorder 
against North Americans and Europeans.   
The seeds of ISIS were being sown as the US experienced the worst economic downturn 
since the Great Depression of the 1930s, known as the ‘Recession of 2008’ (officially lasting from 
December 2007 to June 2009).  The recession affected the lives of millions of Americans with the 
bursting of an 8 trillion dollar housing bubble, resulting in a significant loss of family wealth and 
cutbacks in consumer spending that would cripple business growth and investment and trigger 
massive job loss nation-wide.  In 2008 and 2009, the US labor market lost 8.4 million jobs (or 6.1 
percent of all payroll employment), and the income of working-age household fell by more than 
$5,000 (USD) - a total of ten percent- in the two year span.  The recovery came slowly with 
controversial bank bailouts and corporate subsidization, and was overseen by the newly elected 
administration of President Obama and a broad majority of Democrats in both houses of congress 
(EPI 2010).   
For many Americans, the damage was too severe to forget (or forgive) and mixed with 
rising fears and anxieties over, not only financial security within their communities and households, 
but also personal and political security from a nascent foreign terrorist organization in a region of 
the world that was still associated with the events of 9/11.  The economy continued to improve 
overall, but it did not fully restore certain- primarily industrial- sectors of the economy to where 
they once were.  The perceived loss penetrated American psyche for those who felt threatened by 
                                                          
34 This was especially the case as intelligence information was made public that no weapons of mass 
destruction were found in Iraq—and that the Bush administration was very likely aware of the flaws in the 
intelligence they used to justify the invasion from the beginning.   
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the world, abandoned by the system, and betrayed by the leadership.  Inklings of discontent played 
out in virtual communities of people on social media, Fox News, and other alternative sources of 
news and commentary that carried inertia into emotionally charged narratives of grievance and loss.  
An alternative ideology began to cluster around national identity and security, social and 
demographic change, and rightful priority to privilege and prosperity.    
The Mobilization of the Alt-Right in America 
Donald Trump made a name for himself as a real-estate billionaire-turned-reality TV star, 
whose brutal firing practices drew millions of viewers each week.  He relied on this celebrity as a 
platform to air his political skepticism against President Barack Obama; accusing the President of 
lying about his place of birth (in the US) and thereby violating the constitutional rules of the office.  
He became an agent of antagonism and irreverence throughout Obama’s presidency— beyond what 
had been experienced previously with the break-away Tea Party Movement.   Trump’s approach 
mixed the pageantry of a seasoned ratings-mogul with the tactics of the far-right in Europe in order 
to build a brand as a high-powered Washington outsider with all the answers.  He had considered 
entering the presidential race as the Reform party nominee in October 1999, and again in 2012; but 
did not formally commit as a candidate- this time for the Republican Party nomination- until the 
run-up to the 2016 presidential election.  Candidate Trump campaigned on a platform of status 
restoration, in particular dismantling all the decisions made during Obama’s tenure that, in his 
words, “…have disadvantaged the American people by making [them] absolutely less safe and less 
prosperous (Tumulty 2016).”  Hence, his revival of Ronald Reagan’s well-known slogan from his 
1980 campaign for president: Make America Great, Again.35  
The notion that there was a paradigm through which the US could turn back the clock to a 
pinnacle of past prosperity while moving toward an even brighter future seemed at first peculiar.  
But it tapped into the emotions that millions of- predominately white, working class- Americans 
                                                          
35 Although Trump denies having known about Reagan’s popular use of the phrase.   
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felt in post-9/11, post-recession society.  Trump’s message (including his modes and methods of 
delivery) drew enthusiastic support from those who felt ‘left behind’ by the progress of the nation 
or threatened by its future trajectory.  Part of realizing this ‘again’ meant addressing much of the 
social and political change (real and perceived) of the past decade, including reigning in the forces 
of globalization through opposition to free trade agreements and controlling the number and nature 
of migrants who either currently reside within or are seeking entry into the US.    
Trump made two promises relating to immigration throughout his campaign, (1) that he 
would build a wall at the US southern border with Mexico to stop immigrants from entering the 
country illegally and (2) that he would enhance the screening of migrants from predominately 
Muslim countries (both residing in and traveling to the US).  In the context of these commitments, 
Trump labeled Mexican immigrants “rapist and criminals”; he also repeatedly targeted immigrants 
from Latin American countries as threats to the ‘American workforce’.  He frequently railed against 
the USRAP as well as the arrival of Syrian refugees—saying that, “They have used the weaknesses 
of this process against us to come into our country and kill us.  This is a great Trojan Horse (Tumulty 
2016).”  Trump also called for something of a ‘loyalty test’ to gauge the ideological leanings of 
Muslim Americans throughout the nation, which would also include similar screenings for any 
individuals arriving to the country from predominately Muslim countries.  The appeals were 
relentless (in his rallies, on twitter, and elsewhere) and nearly unapologetic, winning tremendous 
favor among his supporters and contributing to his electoral victory in November 2016.   
Recent real-time figures for hate crimes against migrants from 2015 through 2016 show a 
nearly 3,000 percent increase in incidents of harassment and violence.  And in the two days 
following Trump’s election as President of the United States, nearly 400 reports of such crimes 
were reported (SPLC 2017).  The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC)- a legal advocacy group 
based in the US- has created a HateWatch project to record all reported incidents of xenophobia 
and intolerance from news articles, social media posts, and direct submissions (online and through 
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twitter, at #ReportHate).  The President of SPLC, Richard Cohen, made the following comment in 
relation to this work, “These are unprecedented times for immigrant communities and their 
supporters.  In twenty-five years of this work, I’ve never experienced anything on this scale of 
intolerance and activism against immigrants.  Someone has to account for the consequences of 
spreading such fear and hate.  Our lawmakers are refusing to act—it is up to us to protect our 
neighbors and make sure we uphold the values of this country (Cohen 2016).”36 
Table 6.2: Cross-Case Comparison, Lebanon and the United States 
LEBANON THE UNITED STATES 
 
Refuges Numbers: 1,000,000 (2016) 
Refugee Regime: Government of Lebanon 
 
Refugee Numbers: 1,300,000 (2016) 
Refugee Regime: US Government/public-private 
resettlement agencies 
 
 
Structural Dimensions of Threat: 
2014 Elections 
Clashes in Arsal 
Previous occupation by Syria 
 
Structural Dimensions of Threat: 
9/11 
Bush Doctrine 
Invasion of Iraq 
2008 economic recession 
 
Anti-Migrant Elite Rhetoric:  
Aon and his FPM party campaign on an anti-refugee 
platform in an elongated election process 
 
Mechanisms of Mobilization:  
the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) 
 
Anti-Migrant Elite Rhetoric: 
Trump scapegoats refugees for insecurity (including 
crimes and violence) and subversion 
 
Mechanisms of Mobilization: 
Alt-Right/Political Rallies/Social media 
                                                          
36 At the time of this writing, President Trump announced a suspension of the USRAP as well as a travel ban 
on seven predominately Muslim countries in the Middle East.   
 
 
 
89 
 
 
 
Examples of Ethnic Xenophobic Activity: 
Social media posts of violence against Syrian refugees 
Signage and imagery in local districts 
Stalking and sexual violence 
Gang violence with metal chains and knives 
Kidnappings and ‘disapperances’ 
 
Examples of Ethnic Xenophobic Activity: 
Intimidation and harassment 
Gun violence 
Physical assault 
Verbal assault and imagery 
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Chapter 7: Ethnic Xenophobic Activity: Theoretical and Policy Implications 
7.1 The Main Thesis and its Empirical Support 
This research has shown that xenophobia is a reality for developed and developing counties 
alike, often in strikingly similar forms; it has also questioned the paradigms through which scholars 
have historically, and disparately, examined xenophobia and ethnic conflict.  From the outset, I use 
constructivist insight to examine the conceptual biases that have placed xenophobia in a western 
framework of theoretical and empirical examination.  I re-cast xenophobia in light of ethnic conflict 
scholarship, in a way that may begin to reveal the broader similarities in the patterns and 
manifestations of, what I term, ethnic xenophobic activity.  And stimulate the development of more 
systemic cross-regional comparative inquiry.   
This research formalizes and develops a cross-national analysis of ethnic xenophobic 
activity which builds on Kaufman’s (2001) theory of symbolic politics.  Throughout this project, I 
have developed a series of statistical analyses- using an original dataset- that provide systematic 
confirmation of the integrative theory of ethnic xenophobia.  The results of the Heckman selection 
model show that the determinants of ethnic xenophobic activity include structural dimensions of 
threat as well as the anti-migrant rhetoric of elites.  In addition, these results are not significantly 
dissimilar across developed and developing host states which provides empirical confirmation of 
the theoretical concept of ethnic xenophobia.  The SEM model further supports the causal pathways 
of the argument, in particular that elites mediate the meaning of structural dimensions of threat that 
drive violent and non-violent ethnic xenophobic activity.   
Two pairs of countries- Kenya and the Netherlands and Lebanon and the US- illustrate the 
similarities in the contemporary patterns and outcomes of ethnic xenophobic activity across very 
different cases; which, once again, provides additional empirical confirmation that the distinctions 
between ethnic conflict and xenophobia are false conceptual constructs.  Despite geographical, 
historical, political, economic, and social differences, common causal themes shine through; the 
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Garissa attacks, Syrian migration crisis and Brexit, the 2014 elections, and 9/11 (leading into the 
invasion of Iraq and the economic crisis of 2008) were all significant structural threats that provided 
opportunities for elites to exploit native anxieties with divisive symbolic rhetoric.   
The remainder of this chapter is organized around a discussion of the implications of this 
research across the following three categories: (1) policy-making at both the national and 
international level, (2) practical intervention in the field of migration advocacy and protection, and 
(3) future academic engagements in the systematic study of ethnic conflict and xenophobia.  This 
discussion is based on a series of conversations and interviews with nearly two dozen actors in 
these fields, and is intended to offer insight into how the results of this study can influence practical, 
academic and policy efforts to reduce the prevalence of ethnic xenophobic activity in all its forms.  
It is also intended to shed light on pathways of future research opportunities in this area of study.   
This project may lead some readers to feel pessimistic about the future prospects for 
reduction or prevention of ethnic xenophobic activism.  But, I believe, this study shows that ethnic 
xenophobic activity is far from an inevitable by-product of structural dimensions of threat and 
symbolic elite rhetoric.  There are communities and cases where the theory is falsifiable, where 
preconditions of ethnic xenophobic activity exist, and yet such intolerance does not occur or is on 
the decline.  While such situations are fruitful areas of future research, as will be discussed further 
below, the cases examined for this project suggest that these contrasting situations have something 
in common: refugees and natives have robust and resilient relational networks centered upon 
economic exchange and associational interconnectedness.  This suggests that intercommunal 
aspects of civil society, especially those in the economic or private sector spheres, are worth 
exploring as potential bulwarks against the mobilization of anti-migrant intolerance.  The notion 
that these relational frameworks contribute to peace between groups is itself nothing new; in his 
work on Hindu-Muslim ethnic riots in India, Ashutosh Varshney has argued very clearly that such 
“intercommunal civic life is the key to peace” (Varshney 2002: 282).  How one may go about 
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developing such intercommunal resilience between refugees and natives is, then, the baseline from 
which the following recommendations for future policy, practical and academic work are formed.  
I focus on the prospects of innovation across these categorical sectors that are likely to unlock the 
development or economic potential of refugees in coordination with local markets for the sake of 
cultivating robust, prejudice-resilient relationships.   
7.1 Policy-Making at both the National and International Level 
 In its search for the cross-national factors that determine ethnic xenophobic activity, this 
research has shown specifically that the nature of relationships between native and refugee 
communities matter a great deal.  In particular, ethnic xenophobic activity is shown to occur and 
intensify in situations where elites mobilize structural threats among natives with anti-migrant 
rhetoric and symbolism.  The potency and effectiveness of these elite exploits depends, however, 
on the existing relationships between refugees and natives.  Since relational ties between these two 
groups are generally weak across different contexts, elites are able to effectively stir the kinds of 
emotional potency that mobilize often widespread ethnic xenophobic activity among native groups. 
More robust relationships between natives and refugees (or migrants in general), especially of the 
economic variety, are- therefore- more likely to challenge the credibility of such elite symbolism 
and build collective resilience against the effectiveness of anti-migrant elite rhetoric in the wake of 
structural crises and events.   
 This seemingly simple relational objective confronts a stark policy landscape, however.  
For one, the international refugee regime- led by the UNHCR- is a juggernaut of complex policy 
infrastructure (known as the “conceptual maze”) that is stuck between its 20th century past and the 
realities of 21st century displacement.  In broad strokes, the regime has failed- on a number of 
occasions- to fully transition from the traditional, short-term model of relief application and crisis 
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response for refugees to integrated, long-term recovery and development solutions.37  For the most 
part, the policy paradigm of relief operations remains unchanged from its inception more than half 
a century ago— refugees flee conflict and persecution to neighboring countries while donor states 
provide funds for external assistance and protection programs to the UNHCR and its local partners 
until refugees are able to either return home or until the baton is passed on to development actors 
to facilitate integration efforts.  This approach is based on two faulty assumptions: (1) that the 
pathway from relief to development (including the integration of refugees into local economies) is 
linear and (2) that funding sources from donor states will remain consistent through the period of 
external intervention and assistance.  The reality is that most large-scale, increasingly protracted 
refugee relief situations are stuck in an operational phase that lies somewhere past immediate relief 
intervention but just shy of tactical development work at the community level.  The result is a 
nebulous infrastructure of aid dependency and policy ambiguity which props-up the fallacy of 
temporariness with waning stocks of resources and attention from donors.  This conventional 
approach to refugee assistance is increasingly unsustainable.  The relief-development limbo 
contributes to the policies of refugee containment and sequestration sought out by so many host 
state governments, and animates the stereotypes of refugees as ‘dependents’ or ‘burdens’ within 
host state society.  It often too precludes meaningful pathways to longer-term social engagement 
or relationship building between refugees and host communities since many refugees remain unable 
to work (legally) or engage in livelihood activities that would promote inclusion in business, civic 
life, or formal institutions.  The skills, talents, and aspirations of generations of refugees is 
frequently squandered—ranging from the Dadaab camps in Kenya to the Nyarugusu camp in 
                                                          
37 The UNHCR has technically had a long history of searching for durable solutions alongside development 
actors (starting with the International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa, ICARA, in 1984), 
including a number of policy papers and deliberations, but efforts to change/implement policy or apply new 
frameworks on the ground have been minimal.    
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Tanzania and the position of many Palestinians throughout the Middle East, such situations are 
often described as a ‘denial of rights and a waste of humanity’ (USCRI 2004).   
As a second, related issue, primary host states have taken it upon themselves to unilaterally 
develop exclusionary, often rights-violating policies, outside of the regime framework in order to 
minimize the impact of refugees on local labor markets, politics and civic life.  This is especially 
true as- once again- refugee crises persist into decades-long, if not permanent, situations of arrival 
and settlement.  Simultaneously, the main donor states of the international refugee regime 
(including the US, Australia and a handful of nations in Western Europe) are dramatically reducing 
both monetary and resettlement support which places even more pressure and demand on 
developing neighbor states to host larger numbers of refugees with less resources, for longer periods 
of time.  The framework of durable solutions is, then, becoming increasingly regionalized and 
focused on host states within refugees’ regions of origin.  The processing of refugees off-shore, the 
designation of ‘safe places’ within border regions of neighboring states or even within countries of 
origins themselves, and the premature return of still very vulnerable people-groups to existing 
zones of conflict and persecution all signal a significant shift in the nature of involvement and 
commitment of the regime’s main actors.   The Merkel Deal- as discussed in the case of the 
Netherlands in Chapter 6- is perhaps the most immediate, well-known case-in-point of such 
regionalization efforts; which airlifts thousands of newly arrived refugees from European Union 
countries back to camps in Turkey in exchange for partial accession to the EU and a suite of 
diplomatic and material accompaniments.  The result of this trend has been for host states to either 
threaten the dissolution of camps and settlement policies in order to push back against the short-
falls of commitment (often perceived as negligence), or to continue to force the containment of 
refugees into frequently overcrowded, under-resourced camps for the foreseeable future.  Needless 
to say, this does nothing to promote sturdier relations between refugees and their hosts, and only 
advances the use of symbolic politics as a strategy of extremist elites.   
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 With a glacially paced international refugee regime that is wedged between the 
diminishing commitment of major donor states and the exhaustion of neighboring host countries, 
the private sector is emerging as a potential remedial intermediary.  Both Alexander Betts and Paul 
Collier have called for advanced private sector engagement in refugee crises, specifically with the 
establishment of special economic zones (SEZs) in or around large concentrations of refugee 
populations (Betts and Collier 2015).  In theory, SEZs hit the sweet-spot of a ‘win-win-win’ 
scenario for refugees, their countries of origin, and their hosts: they have the potential to incubate 
‘economies in exile’ for large concentrations of long-staying refugees by providing an 
infrastructure of industrial training and occupation with multinational companies as well as those 
similarly displaced by conflict or disaster; they promote commercial and industrial development 
and trade for the host country with high rates of return on limited resource-commitment or 
investment; they contribute to a framework of resiliency within the region of origin for potential 
dislocations in the future; and they provide refugees with a source of employment and access to a 
full-range of livelihood activities and benefits, including relationships with co-workers of native 
and foreign origin.  As a potential side-benefit, SEZs could also help streamline the flow and 
delivery of aid and assistance to refugees and host communities in ways that are similar to camps, 
without the restrictions on freedom, independence or dignity and without the loss of investment 
once camps are closed.  In addition, SEZs are complimentary of UNHCR’s policy to avoid the 
establishment of refugee camps wherever possible, especially in regions where displacement is 
likely to include large numbers of people for long periods of time.  The UK government in 
coordination with several UN offices and sub-contracting agencies is presently piloting an SEZ 
project for refugee residents in the Zaatari refugee camp in southern Jordan.  The Zaatari camp in 
Jordan lies a short distance away from the King Hussein Bin Talal Development Area, which is 
already designated as an SEZ.  This is the place where some of the sharpest policy minds in the 
world are at work, pushing for a plan to relocate Syrian refugees out of camp and into legal work 
and residence.  On 26 June 2016, a deal was finalized between the Government of Jordan and the 
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EU granting sought-after trade concessions in exchange for work opportunities for refugees.  The 
agreement spans ten years and will apply to fifty-two product groups that are manufactured in 
SEZs, on the condition that producers employ more Syrian refugees.38  One of the primary aims is 
to attract investment and employment, but the SEZ may also have implication for the rebuilding of 
the Syrian economy in exile (especially for business or corporations that were also forced out by 
the conflict).  It is what Betts has called, “The Zonal Development Model”.  He suggests that the 
development of such manufacturing clusters will benefit refugees, and will have great implications 
for a struggling Jordanian economy that is in desperate need of an industrial opportunity; it may 
also have future implications for developing pathways to circular labor migration in the region 
(Miller 2016).  The goal, of course, is for successful implementation and replication in similar 
circumstances among some of the most heavily affected host states in the region.   
7.2 Practical Interventions in the Field of Migration Advocacy and Protection 
 For a number of years practitioners in the fields of migration advocacy and protection, 
particularly for refugees, have stressed the need for programs and efforts to foster self-sufficiency 
so that refugees can engage meaningfully and reciprocally in the development of their host 
communities while building (and maintaining) the skills that would be required for work if/when 
they were to return to their homeland.  On the ground, both multilateral and local organizations 
have worked on such initiatives to reduce refugee reliance on indefinite assistance and to dissolve 
what the UNHCR has historically called ‘care and maintenance’ programs for refugees in camps.  
These efforts have focused mainly on long-term refugee situations in rural areas where refugees 
are granted a plot of land to farm or a herd of livestock to raise in coordination with local farmers 
and shepherds, often in share-cropping arrangements.  But the implications of a self-reliance 
                                                          
38 The requirement for workforces is 15% Syrian participation now, rising to one-quarter after three years.   
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approach extend much further, especially as the number of self-settled refugees continues to 
increase in predominately urban areas.   
Across settlement contexts, the policy- or ‘best practices’- goal of practitioners, in general, 
should be to reduce the number and extent of parallel structures that externalize refugee assistance 
and interfere with the role of the state and civil society in their inclusion of refugees.  Of course the 
consultation of refugees and local host communities is integral in order to assess and gauge capacity 
and preparedness of communities both in terms of material support and social receptivity.  But 
developing synergies between the delivery of refugee services and national development planning 
efforts is an equally imperative piece of the settlement process.  This might include a framework 
similar to the self-reliance strategies employed for refugee groups and host communities in the 
camps of Northern Uganda, or the less formalized arrangement of Sahrawi refugee workers in the 
textile factories of southwest Algeria.  Central to these efforts is a major shift-in-focus among 
service providers toward a market-based approach that builds upon the economic activities of 
refugees themselves; of particular interest are cash-based interventions for refugees, especially in 
urban settings.   The adaptation and innovation of service delivery for refugees is more crucial than 
ever before—not only because of the challenges of providing services to self-settled populations 
scattered throughout cities, but also because of the market implications of material aid in these 
situations.  Cash-based assistance programs may seem relatively insignificant on the surface, but 
they have tremendous development potential for refugees and host communities alike: they restore 
the purchasing power of refugees as independent consumers in the host state economy; they 
empower refugees to choose how they may best go about satisfying their needs as a household; 
they promote platforms of equal exchange in goods and services between refugees and locals; and 
they cultivate both formal and informal financial planning and institutional engagement for 
refugees and their families, including small business development, home ownership, and 
emergency preparedness often through rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs).  Cash-
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based interventions are likely to contribute to stronger private sector engagement in the 
development activities of refugee service providers as well, to unlock the development potential of 
refugees and establish what have been called “refugee development coalitions” which may include 
intercommunal consumer interest groups or multi-ethnic investment boards.  The goal is to engage 
the private sector in the cultivation of intercommunal resilience.  In Germany, for example nearly 
forty companies have joined together in an initiative called “We Together” (or “Wir-Zusammen”).  
Thyssenkrupp, for example, has pledged the creation of an additional 150 apprenticeship 
placements and 230 internships for refugees at their facilities over the next two years.  Such skills-
based training arrangements with the private sector are a strong step toward providing integrated 
support services to refugees.  The We Together group have developed a website and are presently 
organizing a summit so that they may present their integration programs together for the first time.  
In addition, the companies are consulting with refugee scholars and experts to expand their 
knowledge and update their practices to successfully incorporate large numbers of refugees into 
the workforce.  As a principle of this approach, they establish working-care groups of German 
employees (including their families) to act as mentors and resources to refugees who join their 
ranks.  Multinational companies such as IKEA and Starbucks have likewise made pledges to 
employ refugees and provide integration services and support within their places of work.  Overall, 
there is a great need to understand the economic lives of refugees and host communities better, and 
to stop looking at outcomes as shaped solely by states and refugees, but also by markets and private 
interest groups.   
For practitioners in the field, planning on the basis of data, information and analysis should 
also be paramount—especially as refugees increasingly face environments of hostility and 
uncertainty.  Of particular importance are protection interventions and programs that enhance the 
routine monitoring and evaluation of refugee (and more broadly migrant) vulnerability without fear 
of reprisal or loss of status.  The scale of ethnic xenophobic activity presented throughout this 
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project illustrates clearly the weaknesses of existing community-based protection frameworks, 
including the ways that information is reported, shared and analyzed.   
7.3 Academic Engagement in the Study of Ethnic Conflict and Xenophobia 
 It has been shown that the existing scholarship relating to xenophobia suffers from a 
conceptual bias that prevents it from appreciating the cross-national similarities in the 
manifestations of anti-migrant intolerance across developed and developing regions.  By situating 
xenophobia within the theoretical framework of ethnic conflict, this study has leveled the playing 
field of inquiry so that future scholars may embark on similar cross-national inquiry within an 
integrated conceptual paradigm.  The use of the term ethnic xenophobic activity is meant to indicate 
a shift toward a more intentionally equalized approach to the study of anti-migrant prejudice and 
actions of all types across all contexts.  It is intended also to reinforce that xenophobic activity 
qualifies as a form of ethnic conflict whether it occurs in New York or Nairobi.   
 An important departure for this project is the use of a mixed methods approach to inquiry.  
Existing studies of xenophobia tend toward econometric analysis using regional survey datasets 
while the ethnic conflict literature remains heavily saturated with qualitative case studies.  This 
project shows that the limitations of each approach are best reduced when used in combination with 
one another.  It also demonstrates that important causal pathways can be systematically explored 
for a range of seemingly dissimilar cases.  This is not to say that weaknesses do not exist.  In many 
ways, this study raises more opportunities than it does answers in terms of how future scholarship 
may go about examining the politics of migration and intolerance. 
 The research on incidents of anti-migrant activity is in its infancy.  An obvious next step 
to extend what has been started here would be to examine cross-national incidents (and intensity 
levels) of ethnic xenophobic activity across migrants of all types.  This will require extensive and 
tedious attention to data collection from a variety of sources to develop estimates of global 
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migration figures, especially for countries in developing regions.  The question is raised as to 
whether the processes of ethnic xenophobic activity put forth in this study (for refugees) would in 
fact extend to other types of migrants as well; or does the symbolic politics of elites somehow work 
differently across different categories of foreigners.  Generalizations have been made throughout 
this study that assume the processes work the same, but this is not adequately examined empirically, 
and there are theoretical reasons that could be thought of as to why differences in outcomes might 
exist.   
Yet another way forward is to build an interactive, transnational database- similar to that 
of the Southern Poverty Law Center’s HateMap- to capture reports of ethnic xenophobic activity 
in real time across regions.  This, again, would require broad-scale coordination among a variety 
of actors on-the-ground and likely local law enforcement agencies as well—but the implications 
for data to influence the improvement of policies of community based protection would be 
immense. Such data could may also provide opportunities for projects to examine trends in ethnic 
xenophobic activity spatially, with visualization of data points and activisms around the world.    
 In the short-term, the case studies presented here could be expanded to include in-depth 
examinations of cases where ethnic xenophobic activity has low-level occurrence or has declined 
over time.  Two primary candidates for inclusion in such an endeavor are Uganda and Canada 
which have both experienced trends counter to the majority of countries with respect to anti-migrant 
hostilities and activisms.  Countries in Latin America should also be included in future research, 
especially as they become increasingly popular alternative destinations of resettlement for refugees 
from major disasters and conflicts in the Middle East and Africa.  And because of some of the 
unique institutional arrangements at the regional level that are meant to increase cross-national 
cooperation and curb hostilities toward refugees, in particular the “Solidarity Resettlement 
Programme”.  Such in-depth case examinations could further expose the national and municipal-
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level institutional influences on ethnic xenophobic activity, including political party structures and 
resettlement policy frameworks.   
 The exact symbolic language of elites could be further examined as well.  The measure of 
elite symbolic rhetoric used here is a first-cut at an attempt to shed light on how the construction 
of hostile threat-narratives influences mass mobilization against perceived outsiders.  There are 
many prospective improvements to be made; for one, elite rhetoric could be categorized into a 
typology of anti-migrant discourse to shed light on the patterns of symbolic politics that occur most 
frequently or are most potent across different contexts.  Elites could also be categorized by position 
in relation to the executive office or further specified as national or local level actors.  Major policy 
interventions at both the national and international level are likely worth consideration in future 
research too—especially as they can often represent the institutionalization of elite rhetoric and 
legitimation of anti-migrant actions.  Regime level factors- such as the financial or aid contributions 
and resettlement rates- may likewise hold implications for policy activism and elite rhetoric that 
remain largely unspecified here.   
 A general guidance is to move toward a more holistic understanding of the lives of host 
communities and refugees—most of the work in this area has been done away from academia, by 
organizations for a particular instrumental purpose: either to enhance livelihood interventions or to 
justify inclusion of refugees in national development plans.  There is a need to develop a 
theoretically informed and data-driven approach to understanding the dynamics of the social, 
economic, and political engagement between refugees and locals.  The distinct institutional 
positioning of refugees (and other categories of migrants) is likely to influence the boundaries of 
such relationships and hold implications for intercommunal life between groups.  The fact that 
refugees lie between state and international governance, between the formal and informal sectors, 
and between national and transnational economies must also be appreciated—especially as these 
institutional positions have the potential to foster the growth of transnational communities that 
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likewise may contribute to innovation and guard against the rise in ethnic xenophobic activity.   As 
long as refugees remain a distinctly ‘humanitarian’ issue in the minds of global development actors, 
host states and their populations, the true development potential of human mobility will remain 
unseen and intolerance will likely continue to rise.  In the end, to establish resilient relationships 
between refugees and host communities, the development potential of displacement must begin to 
be harnessed more effectively.   
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APPENDIX A: List of Countries in the Analysis
 
Angola 
Austria 
Belgium 
Burkina Faso 
Botswana 
Burundi 
Canada 
Cameroon 
India 
Ivory Coast 
Central African Republic 
Chad 
Congo 
Denmark 
Djibouti 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
Egypt 
Ethiopia 
Finland 
France  
Gambia 
Ghana 
Germany 
Guinea-Bissau 
Greece 
Guinea 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Iraq 
Israel 
Italy 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Liberia 
Lebanon 
Libya 
Mauritania 
Malaysia 
Malawi 
Mali 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
 
 
Namibia 
Nigeria 
Niger 
Norway 
Netherlands 
Philippines 
Portugal 
Rwanda 
South Africa 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
Spain 
Sri Lanka  
Sudan  
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Syria 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Togo 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uganda 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe
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APPENDIX B: Summary Statistics of Key Variables 
 
Variable Name             Observations                    Mean                        Std Dev             Min/Max 
  
         XAV       1,590    3.24                11.49                 0/72 
         XANV       1,590    5.98                            7.06                        0/54 
         XAD                           1,590                          .869                            .364                           0/1 
         Electyr                        1,589                          .217                            .41                             0/1 
         EliCnt                         1,590                           187.17          487.11                0/5212  
         XENINT                   1,590                            9.22                          11.63                        0/106 
         SoGlob                       1,590                            1.35                          11.02                 0/92.1 
         SFI                              1,590                           -10.49                        44.7                         0/24 
         RefNum                      1,589                           239221.7                   554354           19/7949507 
         UrPopperchs       1,590                           50.36                         23.59                 0/97.8 
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APPENDIX C: Dissertation Codebook 
Anna Rannou 
Dissertation Project  
CODEBOOK 
May 2016 
ABSTRACT: The fire-bombing of refugee registration centers throughout Germany in late 2015 was quickly addressed 
as a “blatant act of xenophobic hatred” in a string of incidents that targeted the growing number of Syrian refugees in 
the country (UNHCR 2015; Connelly 2015).  Similar arsonist attacks against Syrian refugee communities in Lebanon a 
few months prior received little attention from the international community and were not directly referenced as 
xenophobic in nature.  Speculation quickly swirled around the German attacks; many experts pointed toward the 
mainstreaming of the radical right along with the growth in native fear and uncertainty as explanations for the uptick in 
hostilities (Betts 2015; PRI 2015).  Others suggested that the fire-bombs were intended as retaliation for preceding 
events in Paris or as a deterrent for other prospective terrorists in the region (Guardian 2015; Herbert 2015; Times 
2015).  Meanwhile, the incidents in Lebanon remain largely un-analyzed by scholars or practitioners, left dangling as 
yet another outburst of violence in a region where isolated incidents of refugee-targeted xenophobia are often buried in 
the aggregate of ethnic competition and conflict.  After the burnings in Lebanon, Nadim Houry - Deputy Director of 
Human Rights Watch for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) - stated, “Even prior to the large number of 
arrivals in Lebanon, we have definitely seen an increase in hostilities toward refugees— with arsons, police violence, 
and local opposition.  There is plenty of fear-spreading and blaming from politicians and others, especially in Beirut, 
but not a lot of attention or concern about the consequences.  It is no surprise that no one is talking about these 
incidents or how comparable they may be to others elsewhere (Houry 2015).”   
Despite the exceptional nature of the Syrian migration crisis, the arson attacks in Germany and Lebanon are part of a 
more general trend relating to a surge in rates of anti-refugee activism across host states worldwide; there is, however, a 
general lack of systematic inquiry into the common, cross-regional patterns of such xenophobic activity.  This project 
takes a first-step in examining the rise of anti-refugee activity across developed and developing host countries, drawing 
particular attention to the underlying similarities in xenophobic activism across regional contexts.  I raise three primary 
questions of interest:  why is anti-refugee activism on the rise in host countries worldwide?  Are the determinants of 
anti-refugee activism more or less similar across developing and developed host states?  Do international events and 
actors play a role in mediating levels of such xenophobic activity?  Using an original dataset, I demonstrate that 
average rates of activism against refugees- both among natives and on behalf of the state- have risen across nearly all 
fifty host countries observed over the past twenty-four years (1990-2014).  The over fourteen thousand incidents 
recorded for this study reveal several generalizable trends, including large escalations in xenophobic activity around 
host state election years and more frequent violent attacks in urban areas during periods of economic or political shock.  
Numbers remain an important part of the broader story as well, especially as refugee arrivals exceed twenty percent of 
the previous year’s total.  I situate these findings in a comparative framework, focusing on the destabilizing effect of 
elections in divided societies and the role of ethnic competition in times of national stress and uncertainty.  I also 
underscore how host states elites learn to use systems of divided authority and governance- primarily as it relates to the 
international refugee regime- to shirk responsibility, garner benefits, and gain political advantage in ways that 
compound local tensions and contribute to increased levels of xenophobic activity.   
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Var Name Description Range Source 
XA(#), DV1 Count variable of 
number of xenophobic 
events  
Continuous International 
media/print 
publications/online 
news 
sources/humanitarian 
archives/first-hand 
sources/unclassified 
government docs 
*Cross-checked with 
ACLED 
XA(V), DV2 Count variable of 
number of VIOLENT 
xenophobic events 
Continuous International 
media/print 
publications/online 
news 
sources/humanitarian 
archives/first-hand 
sources/unclassified 
government docs 
*Cross-checked with 
ACLED 
XA(NV), DV3 Count variable of 
number of NON-
VIOLENT 
xenophobic events 
Continuous International 
media/print 
publications/online 
news 
sources/humanitarian 
archives/first-hand 
sources/unclassified 
government docs 
*Cross-checked with 
ACLED 
XA(O), DV4 Ordinal measure of 
type and scale of 
xenophobic activity 
0- No XA 
1- Low levels 
of non-
violent XA 
2- Moderate to 
high levels 
of non-
violent XA 
3- Low levels 
of violent 
XA 
4- Moderate to 
high levels 
of violent 
XA 
International 
media/print 
publications/online 
news 
sources/humanitarian 
archives/first-hand 
sources/unclassified 
government docs 
XA (S), DV5 Count variable of 
number of xenophobic 
activities including 
state actors (police 
Continuous International 
media/print 
publications/online 
news 
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force/military/peri-
military) 
sources/humanitarian 
archives/first-hand 
sources/unclassified 
government docs 
 
XA (D) Dichotomous measure 
of XA  
0- No XA 
1- XA 
 
Coded from XA (#) 
ElectYr Dichotomous measure 
of election year 
0- No election 
1- Election 
 
IDEA 
Ref# Count variable for 
total number of 
refugees in host 
country 
Continuous UNHCR database 
Ref% Number of refugees as 
percent of host 
country population 
Continuous (%) UNHCR database 
RefDist Nominal variable 
measures distribution 
of refugees in host 
country (rural, urban, 
camp) 
1- Rural 
2- Camp 
3- Urban 
Humanitarian 
archives/International 
media/print 
publications/online 
news/unclassified 
government 
docs/UNHCR database 
HSPop Count variable of host 
state population 
Continuous UN Population 
database 
UrPop%(HS) Urban population as 
percentage of total 
host state population 
Continuous (%) UN Population 
database 
UnEmp% Percent unemployed 
of host state labor 
force 
 
Continuous (%) World Bank 
HCT Dichotomous measure 
of whether a high 
causality terrorist 
(HCT) event has 
occurred  
0- NO HCT 
event 
1- HCT event 
INSCR data 
EliCnt(#) Count variable of the 
number of references 
made to refugees by 
political elites 
(including heads of 
state, ministers, MPs, 
diplomats and 
religious leaders) 
Continuous WEISS Event 
data/TABARI software 
EliCnt(O) Ordinal measure of 
tone of comments 
made by political 
0- Neutral 
reference 
Coded from EliCnt(#) 
variable source 
 
 
108 
 
elites toward refugees 
(neutral, positive, 
negative) 
1- Positive 
reference 
2- Negative 
reference 
Polity Annual measure of 
democracy and 
institutional features 
 
-10 to 10 Polity IV 
GDPpc GDP per capita Continuous World Bank 
 
Conflict Dichotomous measure 
of whether the host 
state was involved in 
any conflict 
(civil/interstate with 
more than 25 battle 
deaths) 
 
0- No conflict 
1- Conflict 
UCDP/PRIO 
HDI Human Development 
Index (HDI) is a 
composite statistic of 
life expectancy, 
education, and income 
per capita indicators, 
which are used to rank 
countries into four 
tiers of human 
development. 
- Every 5 years 
0 to 1 UNDP 
SFI 
 
EFF 
 
Legit 
 
SecEFF 
 
 
PolEff 
 
 
EconEff 
 
*SEE SFI 
CODEBOOK 
State Fragility Index 
 
Effectiveness Index 
 
Legitimacy Index 
 
Security Effectiveness 
Index 
 
Political Effectiveness 
Index 
 
Economic 
Effectiveness Index 
SFI= effectiveness 
score + legitimacy 
score (25points 
possible); The State 
Fragility Index and 
Matrix 2014 lists all 
independent countries 
0-25 (low to high 
fragility) 
0-13 (low to high 
fragility) 
0-12 (low to high 
fragility) 
0-3 (low to high 
fragility) 
 
0-3 (low to high 
fragility) 
 
0-4 (low to high 
fragility) 
INSCR 
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in the world in which 
the total country 
population is greater 
than 500,000 in 2014 
(167 countries). The 
Fragility Matrix scores 
each country on both 
Effectiveness and 
Legitimacy in four 
performance 
dimensions: Security, 
Political, Economic, 
and Social, at the end 
of the year 2014. Each 
of the Matrix 
indicators is rated on a 
four-point fragility 
scale: 0 “no fragility,” 
1 “low fragility,” 2 
“medium fragility,” 
and 3 “high fragility” 
with the exception of 
the Economic 
Effectiveness 
indicator, which is 
rated on a five-point 
fragility scale 
(including 4 “extreme 
fragility”). The State 
Fragility Index, then, 
combines scores on 
the eight indicators 
and ranges from 0 “no 
fragility” to 25 
“extreme fragility.” A 
country’s fragility is 
closely associated 
with its state capacity 
to manage conflict; 
make and implement 
public policy; and 
deliver essential 
services and its 
systemic resilience in 
maintaining system 
coherence, cohesion, 
and quality of life; 
responding effectively 
to challenges and 
crises, and sustaining 
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progressive 
development. 
 
Inflate Inflation rate; Inflation 
as measured by the 
consumer price index 
reflects the annual 
percentage change in the 
cost to the average 
consumer of acquiring a 
basket of goods and 
services that may be 
fixed or changed at 
specified intervals, such 
as yearly. The Laspeyres 
formula is generally 
used. 
 
Continuous (%) World Bank 
Coups 
 
*Coups are also 
measured in the 
SFI  
Dichotomous measure 
of 
attempted/successful 
coup occurrence.   
 
0= no coup 
1= coup/attempted 
INSCR 
KOF Globalization 
Index 
 
 
EcGlob 
 
SoGlob 
 
PoGlob 
 
-----------------------
------- 
Pcont 
 
INFO 
SEE Codebook for 
definitions and 
sources: 
KOF CODEBOOK 
 
Economic 
Globalization 
 
Social Globalization 
 
Political Globalization 
 
 
Personal Contact 
 
Information Flows 
Ranges vary by 
variable 
 
See: Methods of 
Calculation 
KOF 
Developed 
 
 
Developing 
Indicates 1 for 
DEVELOPED state  
 
Indicates 2 for 
DEVELOPING state 
0-1 
 
 
0-2 
COW regional data 
** CCodes are from the Correlates of War project as are state names and abbreviations 
 
Missing Data/Data Precision 
The missing data code is -99.  Data precision, especially in developing regions, is also an issue of 
consideration.  The data only includes information that I am quite confident is correct; the dataset 
does not include information on key variables where definition of criteria for inclusion was 
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uncertain or missing.  The bias introduced by this approach is the inclusion of information on 
variables in later decades in developed regions.  All developing world event-count data was 
cross-checked with 2014 versions of the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project 
(ACLED) and the Social, Political, and Economic Event Database (SPEED).   
The Dependent Variable: Xenophobic Activity 
Xenophobic Activity as it is used here may include reports of the following activities directed at 
refugees or individuals/groups in refugee-like situations (ranked least to most violent): protests, 
rallies, marches, imagery, demonstrations, campaigns, party formation, signage/brochures, 
broadcasts, taunts/threats, stalking, verbal confrontations, vandalism, theft, destruction of 
property (including arsons), physical assault, kidnapping, police brutality/harassment (including 
the use of tear-gas and spontaneous arrest/detention), sexual exploitation or abuse, gun and knife 
violence, group-based assault, mass weapon (or high casualty) violence.   
 XA(#) 
o The first continuous measure of Xenophobic Activity is a total annual event-
count measure of anti-refugee activity for host states in the sample.  There is no 
distinction made between violent and non-violent events.   
 XA(V) 
o The second continuous measure of Xenophobic Activity is a total annual event-
count measure of VIOLENT anti-refugee activity for host states in the sample.   
 XA (NV) 
o The third continuous measure of Xenophobic Activity is a total annual event-
count measure of NON-VIOLENT anti-refugee activity for host states in the 
sample.   
 XA(O) 
o The ORDINAL measure of Xenophobic Activity orders the severity of activity 
from 0 to 4.  O= no xenophobic activity reported; 1= low levels of non-violent 
xenophobic activity reported; 2= moderate to high levels of non-violent 
xenophobic activity reports; 3= low levels of violent xenophobic activity 
reported; 4= moderate to high levels of xenophobic activity reported 
 The Minorities at Risk dataset was used as a template for categorization 
of the DV.   
 XA (S) 
o This measure of Xenophobic Activity is an event-count measure representing the 
number of anti-refugee incidents involving state actors (primarily member of the 
police force or military forces).  These are included in the total stock of XA in 
the measures above.   
 XA (D) 
o The final measure of Xenophobic Activity is a dummy variable designating 
whether or not XA occurred.  The variable is coded 0 for NO XA and 1 for XA.   
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The Primary Independent Variables 
I argue that the global rise in Xenophobic Activity (XA) is influenced by 3 primary factors: (1) 
host state elections; (2) systemic impact of economic/political shocks; (3) urban growth rates and 
settlement patterns.  I also emphasize the ability of elites to use divided authority to their 
advantage when competing for power, primarily vis-à-vis the presence of the International 
Refugee Regime (IRR); this will be modeled by the elections variable in the quantitative analysis 
and drawn-out more fully in qualitative case studies.   
1. Host state elections 
a. Election year 
i. The election year variable is drawn from the IDEA dataset and models 
national elections for heads of state and legislative bodies.  For European 
Union member states, European Commission elections are also included. 
b. Elite rhetoric 
i. TABARI content analysis software along with hand-coding from 7 
international news and unclassified government sources were used to 
develop an event-count variable of the number of times elites referenced 
refugees in a year (1990-2014).  The terms asylum seeker and displaced 
person were used interchangeably as co-search terms with that of 
refugee.  Elites are classified as heads of states, department ministers, 
members of parliament (MPs), religious leaders, and diplomats; this also 
includes all elites in contest for these positions in a given year.   
2. Systemic impact of economic/political shocks 
a. Economic shock indicators: 
i. Annual unemployment figures for host states drawn from the World 
Bank (available from 1991-2014) 
ii. Annual GDPpc figures for host states drawn from the World Bank 
iii. Annual Human Development Indicator score drawn from UNDP 
(available in 1990, 1995, 2000, 2010-2014) 
iv. Inflation Rates (from World Bank) 
v. State Fragility Index (SFI) 
1. Economic Effectiveness 
b. Political shock indicators: 
i. High Casualty Terrorist (HCT) attacks is used as an indicator of political 
shock and is drawn from INCSR database on HCT (available form 1990-
2014).   
ii. State Fragility Index (SFI) 
1. Political Effectiveness 
2. Security Effectiveness 
3. Urban growth rates and settlement patterns 
a. Percent urban of host state population figures are drawn from the World Bank 
b. The settlement patterns variable indicates the area/condition of settlement for the 
majority of refugees in the host state annually as follows.  These figures were 
compiled using UNHCR country reports, humanitarian news agency reports, and 
unclassified host country documents.   
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i. 1= Majority rural 
ii. 2= Majority camp 
iii. 3= Majority urban 
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